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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Topics surrounding migration and the presence of foreigners in South Africa are rapidly 
gaining importance in light of the occurrences and developments in the country, such as the 
increasing number of foreigners coming to South Africa, the recent amendments to the 
immigration policy and more importantly, the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments witnessed 
across the country, as seen in 2008.  
 
While studies have been conducted with the aim of assessing attitudes toward immigrants and 
migration, longitudinal studies of this nature are rare. This study addresses the identified gap 
by assessing attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa between 1996 and 2013. This 
descriptive longitudinal study uses four waves of World Value Survey data in order to measure 
the trends in four dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners: (1) social tolerance; (2) 
interpersonal trust; (3) employment preference; and (4) attitudes toward migration. Adding to 
the descriptive nature of the study, seven independent variables are included to further 
understand the trends in the four dimensions. These variables include gender, race, employment 
status, education, perceived social class, generalised trust and financial satisfaction.  
 
Five conclusions are drawn from the study, four regarding the four dimensions measured and 
the other pertaining to the general trends in the data: (1) South Africans are becoming more 
intolerant of foreigners. (2) There are growing levels of distrust, not only of foreign 
workers/immigrants but also of people of another nationality. (3) South Africans are moving 
away from the idea that employment priority or preference is to be awarded to South African 
citizens over foreigners as more individuals are becoming either neutral or dismissive about 
the awarding of preference. (4) More South Africans are fostering positive attitudes towards 
migration although the greatest portion of respondents agree that foreigners are to be allowed 
into South Africa on the condition that certain criteria are met. (5) The biggest changes in the 
data are seen between 2006 and 2013. These changes can be linked to the outcomes of the 
global economic downturn in 2008 and the rise of xenophobic sentiments and violence towards 
foreigners in the same period.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Onderwerpe wat oor migrasie en die aanwesigheid van buitelanders in Suid-Afrika handel, is 
besig om in belangrikheid toe te neem. Veral as dit gesien word teen ontwikkelinge soos 
byvoorbeeld die groeiende aantal buitelanders wat na Suid-Afrika kom, die onlangse 
aanpassings in die immigrasiebeleid, en nog meer belangrik, die groei in anti-immigrante 
sentimente wat dwarsoor die land in 2008 te sien was.  
 
Terwyl daar heelwat studies is wat ten doel het om houdings teenoor immigrante en migrasie 
te ontleed, is tydsduurstudies oor hierdie onderwerp baie skaars. Hierdie studie be-oog dus om 
hierdie  gaping te vul deur die houdings teenoor buitelanders in Suid-Afrika gedurende die 
periode 1996 tot 2013 te bespreek. Die tydsduur studie is beskrywende van aard. Dit gebruik 
data afkomstig van die World Values Survey om die neigings in vier dimensies van houdings 
teenoor buitelanders te meet, te wete:  (1) sosiale toleransie; (2) interpersoonlike vertroue; (3) 
werk voorkeur; en, laastens (4) houdings tov migrasie. Bydraend tot die beskrywende aard van 
die studie, word sewe onafhanklike veranderlikes gebruik om ‘n beter begrip van die neigings 
in die vier dimensies te kry. Hierdie veranderlikes sluit in:  geslag, ras, werkstatus, 
onderwysvlak, waargenome sosiale klas, algemene vertroue; en, finansiële tevredenheid. 
 
Vyf belangrike gevolgtrekkings word in die studie gemaak – vier met betrekking tot die vier 
dimensies wat gemeet is en die ander met betrekking tot die algemene neigings in die data. Dit 
is naamlik: (1) Suid-Afrikaners word toenemend meer intolerant teenoor buitelanders;  (2) Daar 
is ‘n groeiende vlak van wantroue, nie net tov buitelandse werkers/immigrante nie, maar ook 
teenoor mense van ander nasionaliteite;  (3) Suid-Afrikaners beweeg weg van die idee dat 
werksgeleenthede alleen aan hulle toegeken moet word, want hulle word meer neutraal of 
verwerp selfs die gedagte dat voorkeur aan Suid-Afrikaners gegee moet word; (4) Meer Suid-
Afrikaners het ‘n positiewe houding tov migrasie alhoewel die meerderheid respondente 
verwag dat hulle binnegelaat moet word op streng voorwaardes; en, (5) Die belangrikste 
veranderinge in die data kom in die periode 2006 tot 2013 voor. Dit kan waarskynlik toegeskryf 
word aan die omvang van die wêreldwye ekonomiese resessie in 2008 en die groei van 
xenofobiese sentimente en geweld teenoor vreemdelinge in dieselfde periode. 
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ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and outline 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the twenty-first century, with the current global order which promotes globalization and the 
relaxation of state boundaries, migration has emerged as a controversial yet critical issue not 
only within the political domain but within the social and economic spheres of society. This is 
due to the progressive movement of people across state boundaries (Kahanec & Zimmerman, 
2008: 2).  
 
In October 2013 it was reported that approximately 232 million international immigrants were 
living across the world (UNDESA, 2013). Between 2000 and 2010, the growth in the number 
of migrants across the globe doubled in comparison to the growth reported in the previous 
decade. However, following the global financial crisis, the increase in the global migrant stock1 
began to slow down (UNDESA 2013). In Africa, however, the international migrant stock 
increased from 15.6 million in 2000 to 18.6 million in 2013.  The increase in the migrant stock 
between 2000 to 2010 and 2010 to 2013 was 1.5 million respectively which indicated that 
although the increase in the global migrant stock was slowing down, the growth on the African 
continent was not following the same trajectory (UNDESA, 2013).  
 
It has been South Africa’s history of receiving migrants from across the globe, such as the 
French2, Dutch3, British4, that has resulted in the country being recognised as “a country of 
immigration” (Rasool, Botha & Bisschoff, 2012: 399). By the late twentieth century, European 
migrants were replaced by migrants from Africa. In 2012 it was reported that South Africa had 
become the host nation of approximately three million foreigners, both documented (legal) and 
                                                          
1 Migrant stock is defined as “the population who was born abroad” (UNDESA, 2013). 
2 The first group of French refugees to arrive in South Africa, specifically the Cape of Good Hope, was in 1688 
(Coertzen, 2011).  
3 Dutch settlers arrived in South Africa over the course of the 1600s and 1700s and developed a small Dutch 
colony on the tip of South Africa (the Cape of Good Hope) (Parker, 2010:126).  
4 Migration from Britain to South Africa began in the early nineteenth century. It is in 1806, according to Van 
Vugt (2000: 22) that Britain assumed control of the Cape and soon after British settlers began arriving in the 
country.  
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undocumented (illegal) (Jost, Popp, Schuster & Ziebarth, 2012). Of the estimated three million 
foreigners, it was thought that approximately 58 000 of those individuals were refugees and 
172 000 were asylum seekers (Jost, Popp, Schuster & Ziebarth, 2012). Attempts to record the 
official number of foreigners (both legal and illegal) in South Africa have been challenged by 
the fact that illegal foreigners in the country- as undocumented individuals- make the 
ascertaining of reliable data difficult (Vigneswaran, 2008: 139).  
 
Kahanec and Zimmerman (2008: 2) state that the process of migration affects two specific 
groups- the native and the migrant populations - as numerous effects are felt by both groups. 
One such effect is seen in the views and attitudes, which may be either negatively or positively 
orientated, formed by the native population towards the migrants (Kahanec & Zimmerman, 
2008: 2). Over and above recognising that positive and negative attitudes are formed against 
migrants, Kleemans and Klugman (2009: 1) assert that attitudes toward migrants and the 
process of immigration are more complicated and complex than perceived and thus are “not as 
monochrome” as we assume them to be (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009: 1). The complexity of 
these attitudes is embedded in the inability to state that one’s attitudes are simply positive or 
negative. Despite this, migration, also referred to as “human capital movement”, has ignited 
and perpetuated a widespread and increasingly recognised culture of “anti-immigrant 
sentiments” (Jewell, Melgar, Molina & Rossi, 2009: 1).  
 
Negative attitudes toward foreigners have been fostered across the globe where one of the more 
explicit manifestations thereof has been the rise in xenophobia directed toward migrants. 
Increasing anti-foreigner sentiments have been reported in both Europe and America, each with 
their own history of migration. The United States of America is considered to have one of the 
highest number of immigrants entering the country annually. Coupled with the increase in 
immigrants in the country has been the worsening of the discrimination these individuals face. 
This is one such example of the existence of negative orientations towards these groups 
(Yakushko, 2009: 58).  
 
Across Europe, a noticeable increase in anti-immigrant sentiment was most evident between 
the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s where some countries continue to foster high and 
increasingly negative attitudes towards foreigners (Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009: 361). 
In 2010 it was reported that the level of negative attitudes toward foreigners residing in 
Germany had increased to the point where a third of Germans said that they want foreigners to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3 
 
be repatriated, while the same portion of citizens believed that “foreigners who settled in 
Germany did so to exploit the generous welfare system or take jobs” (Dempsey, 2010).  
It is believed that the 2008 xenophobic attacks which spread across South Africa, has once 
again raised the world’s awareness to “the growing inner-African sentiments against so-called 
foreigners” (Kersting, 2009: 7). Furthermore, perceptions of foreigners from African countries 
differ between the African elites, middle class and the low income population. While the former 
view people from other African countries as comrades, it is those on the lower income areas 
who hold more negative perceptions of foreigners- they are “often not accepted or even 
tolerated in most of the low-income areas” (Kersting, 2009: 16).  
 
The rise of negative sentiments towards foreigners and immigrants requires a study of these 
complex issues, specifically how such attitudes manifest. The undertaking of such a study in a 
country such as South Africa is motivated by aspects such as a history of violence towards 
foreigners, changes in the founding principles of its immigration policy over time and the 
government’s efforts to foster social cohesion and nation building.    
 
1.2 Background to the study 
The presence of foreigners in South Africa is not a new phenomenon given the country’s 
history of migration which has in part been shaped by its readiness to receive migrant labour 
from African countries and specifically those from the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region (Jost et al., 2012).  
 
The topic of migration to South Africa within the domestic, international and Southern African 
context, has become a prominent fixture on the country’s agenda following the transition to a 
democracy (Hill & Kotzé, 1998: 1) (Hill, 1998: 115). The themes and issues surrounding the 
occurrence of migration in South Africa have included the lack of cohesion and differences in 
the policies of the southern African states which has resulted in an aborted free movement 
regime5. While domestically, South Africa has had to deal with debates surrounding the rights 
of foreigners in relation to those of South African citizens (Hill & Kotzé, 1998: 1). In addition 
to this, four other broader issues relating to migration have emerged: emigration, refugees, 
illegal immigration and contract migration (Hill & Kotzé, 1998: 1). These issues are seen to 
                                                          
5 The free movement regime can be understood as a response to the challenge of trying to monitor and control 
cross-border activities for those countries focused on economic growth and development. This regime is defined 
by the free movement of people and therefore the free movement of labour (Bigo, 2009: 579).  
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have manifested and become more apparent in the strivings to overcome the country’s brain 
drain, the challenges that illegal immigrants have posed to the asylum system and the increasing 
perception of South Africa as a safe haven by refugees and asylum seekers (Illegal immigrants 
a challenge: Pandor, 2014) (Hill, 1998: 1).  
 
However, the reflection on issues relating to migration following the 1994 transition to a 
democracy is to be understood in the context of the nature of migration in South Africa under 
apartheid. The essence of migration and South Africa’s immigration policy under the National 
Party (NP) following its rise to power in 1948 was the consolidation of “Afrikaner power” 
through discouraging white immigration (Anderson, 2006: 99). However in 1960, the NP’s 
stance on white immigration changed as the national government became wary of the obvious 
decline in the proportion of the white population in relation to the entire South African 
population. White immigration was encouraged and facilitated through forms of recruitment 
and subsidies as the national government sought to perfect the number of white immigrants in 
South Africa (Anderson, 2006: 99). Anderson’s (2006) discussion of the changes in 
immigration policy over the span of the NP rule make apparent the intention of the government: 
to use the policy as a mechanism of strengthening political power.  
  
Rasool et al., (2012: 399) argue that South Africa’s immigration policy was structured on the 
principle of migration control6 where residency was awarded to white skilled and professional 
workers. This meant that there was an increase in the white population while filling the gaps 
of skilled workers, gaps which were proving to be detrimental to the country’s economy. 
Despite the focus on migration control, migrants who were accepting of low wages were 
allowed into the country as they were granted permission to work in areas such as the mines 
which also proved to benefit the country’s economy as there were more individuals prepared 
to do the manual labour which the country demanded (Rasool et al., 2012: 399). This is an 
example of how the immigration policy was used as a means of securing white dominance 
while increasing economic development.  
 
According to Crush and McDonald (2001: 2), during the apartheid years, South Africa’s 
immigration policy rested on four pillars: (1) racist legislation and policy, (2) exploiting the 
migrant labour from South Africa’s neighbouring countries, (3) rigid enforcement of 
                                                          
6 See also Louw (2004: 45-46).  
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established legislation and, (4) the rejection of the standards set at international refugee 
conventions.   
First, racist policy and legislation were entrenched in the criteria set out by the then 
white-led government which used race as a determinant of who would be allowed into South 
Africa and the conditions of their entrance (Crush & McDonald, 2001: 2). Between 1960 and 
1991, Japanese who found themselves residing in or travelling to South Africa were granted 
“’honorary white’ treatment” (Osada, 2002: 141). The awarding of the ‘honorary white’ status 
to the Japanese was motivated by the goal of the then South African government to strengthen 
trade relations with the Asian country (Osada, 2002:141). By the 1980s, this pillar resulted in 
having almost all foreigners who were white being welcomed into the country while people of 
colour, more specifically people from the rest of the African continent, were not welcome 
(Crush & McDonald, 2001: 2).  
Second, it was only closer to the end of apartheid that the stringent race based 
immigration criteria was abandoned as certain skilled black immigrants and Asians were 
allowed into the country (Crush & McDonald, 2001: 2). The migrant labour system7, as 
reiterated by Rasool et al. (2012, 399)8 and as quoted above, allowed for migrant workers from 
South Africa’s neighbouring countries to enter the country to work in South Africa’s mines 
and on farms. However, these individuals never qualified for permanent residency in South 
Africa and had to return to the countries once their contracts had expired (Crush & McDonald, 
2001: 3).          
Third, the rigid enforcement of legislation as seen with the pass laws and influx control 
during apartheid, saw the state attempt to police and patrol the external boundaries of the 
country. The Aliens Control Act of 1991 awarded “new powers of entry, search, and arrest to 
immigration officers and the police” (Crush & McDonald, 2001: 3).    
Lastly, the refusal to accept the conditions of the refugee conventions and thus the 
failure to develop a refugee policy meant that many of those who entered South Africa as 
asylum-seekers, were considered and treated as “illegal aliens”9 (Crush & McDonald, 2001: 
                                                          
7 Today, foreign workers employed to work on South Africa’s mines (gold, platinum and coal mines) are 
predominantly from Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland where the greatest number of workers come 
from Lesotho and Mozambique. Between 1996 and 2011, we saw a 27.2% decrease in the number of foreigners 
employed on South African mines (SAIRR, 2013: 91).  
8 Also mentioned in Anderson (2006: 100).  
9 An illegal alien may also be referred to as an ‘undocumented alien’ (Internal Revenue Service, 2014). This is 
someone who has entered a country illegally and can be deported if apprehended. Furthermore, someone is 
classified as an illegal alien if they have legally entered the country but have fallen ‘out of status’ and therefore 
face deportation (Internal Revenue Service, 2014). 
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3). Fundamentally the essence of the country’s migration policy was to inhibit contact between 
South African citizens and those citizens from other African countries (Carter, 2010: 1).  
 
Following the collapse of South Africa’s apartheid regime and the shift to a democratic regime 
in 1994 under the African National Congress (ANC), considerable efforts have been made to 
amend the immigration policy of the NP government. The Immigration Act of 199110, 
nicknamed “Apartheid’s last act”, was rejected by the ANC-led government given the lack of 
emphasis it placed on skills immigration. It was believed that the policy of 1991 did not do 
enough to remedy the lack of required skills in key sectors of the economy (Rasool et al., 2012: 
403). Furthermore the act was deemed unconstitutional under the 1996 constitution and was 
ordered to be redrafted following a period of consultation. In 2002, South Africa’s immigration 
policy was redrafted to attract skilled labour to South Africa in order to meet the demand for 
these skills in key sectors of the economy. The Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 has been 
recognised as being instrumental in attracting skilled foreigners to South Africa and is 
considered to be the cornerstone of South Africa’s immigration policy, (Rasool et al., 2012: 
403)(SAIRR, 2012:91)11.  
 
Despite the efforts made by the democratic government to revise the immigration policies of 
its predecessor, Carter (2010: 1) argues that the apartheid immigration policies have left behind 
a legacy of isolation. It was the crux of the NP government’s strategy - the separation of South 
African citizens from other citizens- which is the root cause of the “isolationist tendencies” we 
see in South Africa today (Carter, 2010: 1). The desire to keep South African citizens separate 
from other citizens is clearly evident in the history of violence inflicted on foreigners in South 
Africa.   
 
Coupled with the influx of migrants12 into South Africa is the documented occurrence of 
attacks against foreigners. While not arguing that violence against foreigners was not prevalent 
prior to the transition to a democracy, it is evident that the occurrence of violence against 
                                                          
10 The Immigration Act of 1991 is also known as the 1991 Aliens Control Act. The essence of this policy is that 
it sets out the “rights and obligations of non-citizens (aliens)” who are entering the country (Kotzé & Hill, 1997: 
14).  
11 A further discussion of South Africa’s immigration policy  and the detailing of the 2014 revisions to the 
policy will be undertaken in Chapter 2  
12 Chapter 2 will elaborate on the influx of foreigners into South Africa by discussing the reported number of 
foreigners in the country including refugees and migrants who have been awarded permanent and temporary 
residence permits. 
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foreigners has become more common since the change in government in 199413 (Jost et al., 
2012). While violence against foreigners, which is believed to be driven by xenophobic 
sentiments, differs in nature, it was the sheer brutality of the 2008 attacks on foreigners which 
resulted in publicized cases of violence against foreigners.  
 
In May of 2008, a total of 62 individuals were killed by agitated mob groupings around South 
Africa; 41 of which were migrants from African countries while the remainder were South 
African nationals who had been mistaken for foreigners (Adam & Moodley, 2013: 23). In May 
2008 alone, 670 people were wounded due to the heightened anti-immigrant violence (Mail & 
Guardian, 2008). News sources reported that the attacks began in Johannesburg on the May, 
11 and shortly thereafter, violent outbreaks were reported across the country as anti-immigrant 
sentiments spread. Foreigners such as Zimbabweans and Mozambicans were attacked and, in 
some instances, had their homes and informal shops looted (Mail & Guardian, 2008). Over and 
above the death of individuals around the 2008 period of heightened violence towards 
foreigners, du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 159) reported that a total of 35,000 individuals were 
driven out of their homes resulting in many of these individuals leaving South Africa and 
returning to their country of origin.  
 
Violence against foreigners continues to plague South Africa as was seen with the 2013 
incident in the Zandela township14 close to Sasolburg where protests directed at the 
dissatisfaction surrounding a proposed merger of two municipalities resulted in the looting of 
shops belonging to foreigners (Adam & Moodley, 2013: 23). This incident yields four 
important questions: (1) Why were foreigners the recipients of a manifestation of 
dissatisfaction for which they were not responsible? (2) What was the mind-set of the local15 
citizens? (3) What were the propagating factors for attacking foreigners and lastly, (4) what 
links can be created between the merger and the presence of foreigners in their area?  
 
A local media source, the Mail & Guardian (2008) argued that the violence inflicted on 
foreigners in South Africa is a response to the perception that foreigners are taking job 
opportunities away from South Africans. This increase in competition for jobs translates and 
                                                          
13 Chapter 2 will elaborate on the history of violence against foreigners in South Africa  
14 A township refers to “densely populated areas that were reserved for non-white populations during Apartheid” 
while an informal settlements are “unplanned residential areas, usually filled with self-built housing or shacks” 
(Misago, Landau & Monson, 2009: 7).  
15 Local or native in this context refers to South African citizens  
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is understood as being an impediment to the access of economic and other resources which 
shape an individual’s socio-economic position. A report compiled by the IOM on the 2008 
xenophobic attacks stated that the use of violence against foreigners was a means used by South 
African citizens to decrease their competition for resources (such as jobs) and violence was 
used as a tool to drive foreigners out of the country (Carter, 2010: 1). Adding to the reasons 
behind the xenophobic attacks, the South African Police Service (SAPS) stated that, “popular 
reasons for xenophobia can be found in a plethora of explanations which are mainly based on 
economical grounds such as housing, education, health care and employment” (SAPS, 2004). 
Furthermore, Bekker adds that, “[T]he underlying reasons for the violence include high 
unemployment, inequality, a lax border control policy, and a nonexistent immigration policy”16 
(Bekker, 2010: 125).  
 
The idea that the presence of foreigners in South Africa leads to an increase in competition for 
jobs and access to other economic goods is relative to the context of South Africa’s economic 
and employment outlook17. Trends indicate that the rate of labour absorption and 
unemployment are indicative of declining access to employment opportunities. South Africa’s 
labour absorption rate, the proportion of the working-age population that are employed, has 
declined from 45.8% in 2001 to 41.1% in 2013 (SAIRR, 2013: 228). These results, which 
indicate that fewer of the working age population (WAP) are being employed, are supported 
by the country’s increasing official, or strict, unemployment rate18 which increased from 24.6% 
in 2001 to 25.6% in 2013 (SAIRR, 2013: 228).  
 
The reason why South Africans foster xenophobic and negative sentiments towards foreigners 
have garnered much attention in the wake of the 2008 attacks. However, very little research 
has been conducted on the attitudinal orientations of South Africans towards foreigners19.  
 
 
 
                                                          
16 These points are discussed and elaborated on in Chapter 2   
17 To be detailed further in Chapter 2  
18 This is according to the strict definition of unemployment used by Statistics South Africa. Here someone (a 
part of the economically active population) is unemployed if they have not worked during the week prior to 
being interviewed, they want to work and are available to work in the week of the sruvey and have actively 
searched for work or tried to start a business in the four weeks prior to the survey (SAIRR, 2002: 198). 
19 Chapter 2 will discuss those studies which are orientated around attitudes towards immigration and migrants 
including those studies which have been conducted in South Africa.  
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1.3 Problem statement and research questions 
The point of departure of this study is the notion that the violence inflicted on foreign nationals 
by native South Africans is a behavioural manifestation of underlying attitudes towards 
foreigners, such attitudes relating to their individual values and beliefs. This study aims to 
assess South Africans attitudes toward foreigners from 1996 to 2013 in order to determine 
whether attitudes, as embedded in dimensions of social tolerance, interpersonal trust, 
employment preference and attitudes towards migration, have changed or remained constant.    
 
More specifically, this study seeks to explore the following questions:  
 Has tolerance towards foreigners increased since the country’s transition to a democracy? 
 To what extent do South Africans trust foreigners post 1996?  
 What are South African citizens’ views on migration to South Africa?  
 What do South Africans believe to be fair in terms of job opportunities presented to both 
foreigners and South Africans?  
 
In adhering to the prescription of longitudinal studies, this study draws on the data from the 
last four waves of the WVS which were conducted in South Africa in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 
2013. The selection of the waves of survey data, between 1996 and 2013, is motivated by the 
purpose of the study: to assess the changes in attitudes towards foreigners subsequent to South 
Africa’s transition to a democracy which took place in 1994.  
 
1.4 Key concepts in the study of attitudes towards foreigners  
The following are the definitions of four key concepts used in this study:  
 
1.4.1 Attitudes 
This study departs from the premise that attitudes shape an individual’s behaviour and response 
to certain circumstances. Allport (1935: 810) defines an attitude as “a mental and neutral state 
of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon 
the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related”. Terre Blanche 
and Stevens (2011: 349) further emphasise that there is a relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour by defining an attitude as “a belief that is essentially learnt, is evaluative, can be 
deduced from both verbal and non-verbal behaviour, has an affective component and forms a 
relatively stable part of the individual’s character”.  
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Krech and Crutchfield (1948: 152) define an attitude as “an enduring organization of 
motivational, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to some aspect of the 
individuals’ world". Schwarz and Bohner (2001: 436) state that when speaking about an 
attitude one needs to consider it being multifaceted thus encompassing different components 
such as the cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioural. Breckler and Wiggins (1989: 
409) define an attitude as “mental and neural representations, organized through experience, 
exerting a directive or dynamic influence on behavior”. These definitions in conjunction with 
those provided by Allport (1935) and Terre Blanche and Stevens (2011) indicate the need to 
acknowledge the relationship between attitudes and an individual’s behaviour (Schwarz & 
Bohner, 2001: 436). This is fundamental to the study as it contextualises the importance of 
assessing South Africans attitudes towards foreigners given the impact that these attitudes have 
on individual behaviour.  
 
1.4.2 Xenophobia20 
According to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, xenophobia is defined as the “attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that 
reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or 
foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013: 192). 
Following from Adjai & Lazaridis (2013) who equate xenophobia to an attitudinal orientation, 
UNESCO (2014b) defines xenophobia as “an attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-
natives in a given population”. Xenophobia can, more simply, be defined as “the hatred or fear 
of foreigners or strangers” or “the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient 
state” (Bekker, 2010: 127). The overlap found in the aforementioned definitions indicates that 
the fundamental element of xenophobia is the strong sense of dislike and poor treatment of 
those thought to be ‘the other’.   
 
1.4.2.1 Othering  
According to Brons (2015: 70), othering involves setting up two groups- the superior, in-group 
(self) and the inferior, out-group (other). The construction of the two groups is based either on 
identifying characteristics that the in-group has, and the out-group lacks, which are deemed 
desirable or identifying undesirable characteristics that the other displays which the self does 
                                                          
20 See also Laher (2009) and UNESCO (2014b) for further definitions of xenophobia.  
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not (Brons, 2015: 70). Adding to the notion of othering involving two distinct groups in unequal 
relation to one another, Jensen (2011: 65) defines othering as the processes whereby powerful 
groups “define sub-ordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way” in ascribing 
“problematic and/or inferior characteristics” to the sub-ordinate grouping.  
 
1.4.3 Migration  
Migration is defined as “[T]he movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an 
international border, or within a state” (IOM, 2011). According to the IOM (2011), it is possible 
to view migration as encompassing “any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, 
composition and causes”. Migration is therefore inclusive of the movement of individuals 
seeking refuge in a host country, displaced individuals, those who have moved for economic 
reasons and other reasons (UNESCO, n.d.).  
 
Statistics South Africa (2013:8) recognises the role that spatial and time dimensions play in the 
conceptualisation and measurement of migration as seen with the differentiation of internal and 
international migration. Internal migration is defined as the movement of the population 
“within the borders of a country”, while international migration is recognised as the “movement 
across the borders of a country” (Statistics South Africa, 2013: 8).  
 
1.4.4 Immigrant 
Similarly, immigrants are defined as, “persons who have moved from elsewhere across the 
borders of South Africa with the intention of changing their country of residence” (Statistics 
South Africa, 2013: 8). More generally, an immigrant is “a person who has moved to another 
country to settle there” (Western Cape Government, 2014).  
 
1.4.4.1 Illegal immigrants or illegal foreigners21  
The rise of migration on the political agenda in the democratic South Africa was largely due to 
rising concerns about the status of refugees and the issue of illegal immigrants in the country 
(Hill, 1998: 1). The Immigration Act no.13 of 2002 defines an illegal immigrant or foreigner 
as “any individual who is neither a citizen of nor a resident in the Republic, and who is in 
                                                          
21 This study focuses solely on measuring attitudes towards foreign workers and immigrants, i.e. those 
individuals who are legally allowed to be in the country. By definition this study does not measure attitudes 
towards illegal foreigners or immigrants in the country although one is not sure what the respondent perceives to 
be a foreign worker or immigrant.   
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contravention of the Act” (Vigneswaran, 2008: 137). A more general definition of an illegal 
immigrant is someone who “has moved to another country without getting permission from the 
government of that country” (Western Cape Government, 2014).  
 
1.4.4.2 Asylum seekers and refugees22 
The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) defines an asylum seeker as a person who has “fled 
his or her country of origin and is seeking recognition and protection as a refugee in the 
Republic of South Africa, and whose application is still under consideration” (Department of 
Home Affairs, 2014d). In the case of an asylum seeker’s application being rejected, they must 
leave South Africa voluntarily or face being deported. In the event of a positive outcome to an 
application, a person is given refugee status as outlined in section 24 of Refugee Act No 130 
of 1998” (Department of Home Affairs, 2014d). These individuals are “entitled to seek 
employment” in addition to being entitled to the same basic health services and primary 
education as other South African citizens (Republic of South Africa, 1998: 20). These 
stipulations are set out in Chapter 5 of the 1998 Refugee Act, which sets out the rights and 
obligations of refugees.  
 
1.5 Research methodology23 
The purpose of this study is to assess attitudes towards foreigners. More specifically, the trends 
in four dimensions which gauge these attitudes between 1996 and 2013. The dimensions 
selected to measure attitudes towards foreigners are: (1) social tolerance, (2) interpersonal trust, 
(3) employment preference and, (4) attitudes toward migration. In order to make descriptive 
observations about the changes in each dimension, this study utilises the data from the last four 
waves of the WVS which were conducted in South Africa. This study thus is a descriptive-
longitudinal study which is dependent on secondary data analysis of the WVS data.  
 
Longitudinal studies stem from wanting to distinguish time dimensions within a study. These 
studies are conducted in such a way that they allow for observations and conclusions to be 
drawn over an extended period of time (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 93)24. According to Bryman 
                                                          
22 Categories of refugees include economic refugees (fleeing poverty), political refugees (fleeing persecution) 
and the more debatable environmental or climate refugee (people who have been forced to leave their 
communities and countries due to environmental disruption that has adverse effects on either existence or 
quality of life) (Ghoshal & Crowley, 1983: 124) (El-Hinnawi, 1985:4).  
23 To be further detailed and expanded as the third chapter of this thesis   
24 See also Menard (1991) and Menard (2008) 
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(2012: 63), these studies involve initially surveying a sample and then doing it again on at least 
one further occasion. There are both benefits and drawbacks attached to undertaking a 
longitudinal study. While its usefulness is embedded in being able to track trends, the time and 
cost involved is one of the reasons why it is seldomly undertaken. The selection of the period 
of study - 1996 to 2013 - has been motivated by the recognition of the rise of the topic of 
migration following the country’s first democratic election in 1994 and availability of WVS 
data. This point is brought forward by the ANC (2011), Hill (1998) and Carter (2010). When 
discussing illegal immigration at their 50th National Congress, the ANC stated that illegal 
immigration from the rest of the continent and world increased and competition for scarce 
resources became more apparent as South Africa emerged as a democracy. Hill (1998:1) 
observes that topics relating to migration “emerged from relative obscurity to become one of 
the most hotly contested policy terrains”, while Carter (2010: 1) argues that violence against 
foreigners in South Africa has become more prevalent since the transition to a multi-party, 
democratic regime in 1994. 
 
One way to overcome the challenges posed by longitudinal studies is to conduct secondary data 
analysis. Secondary data analysis refers to “the analysis of data by researchers who will 
probably not have been involved in the collection of those data for purposes that may not have 
been envisaged by those responsible for the data collection” (Bryman, 2012: 715). The access 
to and use of reputable data sets, where strict sampling and data collection procedures have 
been followed, is an example of the advantages of doing secondary data analysis. Limited 
access to data sets, complexities around the data sets and the lack of control of the quality of 
the data are all problems faced when making use of secondary data analysis25. 
One of the motivating factors for the use of the WVS data in this study is the lack of surveys 
and data sources which are solely dedicated to measuring the dimensions and overall attitude 
to be covered in this study. The WVS is an internationally recognised study in which social 
scientists from across the globe study changes in social, political and economic values and how 
these changes impact on the various domains of the individual’s life (WVS, n.d.). Thus, the 
survey poses questions relating to feelings and orientations towards foreigners, in addition to a 
plethora of other topics. Due to the survey covering an array of dimensions in addition to it having 
prescribed questions in every wave, the selection of the dimensions of attitudes to be studied is 
                                                          
25 Further advantages and disadvantages are discussed in Chapter 3 
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dependent on the questions posed in the WVS and its relation to the purpose of the study26. The 
longitudinal analysis of WVS data will be based on four waves of data for the years 1996, 2001, 
2006 and 2013. 
 
1.6 Rationale and significance  
The specific focus on attitudes towards foreigners, which arguably plays a crucial role in the 
widely reported outbreaks of violence against foreigners and heightened xenophobic 
sentiments in South Africa in recent years, also plays an overarching role in the strivings in the 
political, social and economic arena. These include the generation of social cohesion, the 
progressive movement towards regional integration and, on an international level, 
globalization. Therefore, the motivation for studying attitudes towards foreigners is present in 
the far-reaching impact that these attitudes have on matters which have high priority within 
various spheres. 
 
The results of this study may prove valuable to government and other key stakeholders who 
are involved in the drafting of public policy. The essence of public policy is that it reflects the 
values, attitudes and beliefs of society. This study outlines the attitudes and values that South 
Africans foster towards foreigners and may provide government and policy makers with insight 
into how the citizens feel about foreigners which may in turn influence the drafting of future 
policies.  Furthermore, if such steps are taken by government to align the policies with the 
perspective and values of the people, we may arguably, see a decline in the anti-immigrant 
sentiments and violent attacks of foreigners.  
Furthermore, this study addresses a gap in the literature by focusing solely on attitudes towards 
foreigners. While studies have made use of the World Values Survey data in South Africa and 
have focused on measuring certain attitudes, these studies have focused on the study of attitudes 
towards immigration and less so on perceptions of immigrants and foreign workers. Of those 
studies that have focused on attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa, different questions 
have been asked to measure certain attitudinal dimensions. The use of the WVS is beneficial 
to this study as it provides multiple dimensions which can be used to measure attitudes towards 
foreigners in South Africa. Lastly, the longitudinal assessment of attitudes towards foreigners 
in South Africa has not been fully explored and this study thus pioneers such an investigation.  
 
                                                          
26 Further discussions of the WVS are undertaken in Chapter 3  
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1.7 Chapter outline  
This study will be presented in five chapters, each of which contributes to addressing the 
research questions and overall purpose of the study, which is to assess the attitudes South 
African citizens foster toward foreigners since the transition to a democracy.  
 
The first chapter, as has been set out above, serves as an introduction to the study, details the 
significance of studying individual attitudes, introducing the methodology to be applied in the 
study as well as motivating why this study is to be undertaken.  
 
Chapter two provides a comprehensive assessment of the literature surrounding migration and 
migration policy, immigrants and foreigners within the South African context as well as 
xenophobia as a manifestation of negative attitudes towards foreigners and migration. 
Furthermore, this chapter will detail existing studies which are focused on measuring attitudes 
and orientations towards not only immigrants and foreign workers but towards the process of 
immigration.  
 
Chapter three will expand on the methodology and elements of the research design presented 
in chapter one in addition to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the four dimensions 
of attitudes to be measured in this study. A description of the source of the data as well as 
detailing the method employed in the measurement and analysis of the World Value Survey 
data such as the use of a statistical analysis programme follows.  
 
Chapter four will both present the data and interpret the results of the data analysis, directed by 
the goal of seeking to address the research questions posed in this chapter. In providing a richer 
and deeper study of attitudes, this chapter will also present findings on the demographic and 
socio-economic pockets noted within the study. The interpretation of findings will include a 
summation of the overarching findings of this study while also placing the findings, specifically 
social tolerance, in the context of governments striving toward social cohesion.  
 
Chapter five, the final chapter, will provide a summary of the key findings of the study and 
provide some concluding remarks, including recommendations for future research.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
An assessment of the attitudes that South Africans foster towards foreigners is to be 
contextualised by the policies, events and national conditions which may play a part in the 
development and change in those orientations. Thus, a look at the developments relating to 
migration, such as policy changes, might prove useful in understanding changes in attitudes 
towards foreigners and migration, while an assessment of South Africa’s economic and 
employment outlook may provide insight into the trends seen in employment preference.  
 
It therefore follows that the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature 
on migration within the international and the South African context and the developments in 
South Africa’s immigration policy, including those enacted under the apartheid government. 
Occurrences of xenophobia in South Africa as well as previous studies which focused on 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration will also be addressed. The developments, 
occurrences and findings outlined in this chapter are crucial to understanding the trends 
uncovered in attitudes towards foreigners, as presented in Chapter 4.  
 
2.2 International migration: Globalisation and its increasing trajectory  
Migration has come to be recognised as one of the “defining global issues” of the twenty-first 
century (IOM, 2003). The ongoing process of globalisation, which is characterised by the 
“increasing internationalisation of markets for goods and services” and the increasing 
interconnectedness of the world has been put forward as the overarching explanatory factor27 
responsible for the continued process of international migration (OECD, 2013)(IOM, 2003). 
Kahanec and Zimmerman (2008: 2) argue that improving economic prospects, securing living 
environments and reunification with family members are the primary motivating factors which 
propel individuals to migrate.   
 
                                                          
27 According to the IOM, globalization as a factor explaining migration includes the development of transnational 
transportation systems, the existence of electronic communications, and income and economic discrepancies 
between the developed and the developing world (IOM, 2003).  
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The recognition of the significance of migration as an issue on the international agenda is to be 
understood within the context of the constant growth in global migration or the growth in the 
global migrant stock, despite a deceleration since 2007 (UNDESA, 2013). According to the 
IOM (2003), in 1993 there were an estimated 175 million migrants (defined as people who do 
not live in their home countries) and 10.4 million refugees across the globe. A study by the 
UNDESA found that in 2005, 3% of the global population was on an “international migration 
trajectory”, while the share of international migrants in developed countries totalled 
approximately 9.5% (Kahanec & Zimmerman, 2008: 2).   
 
By 2013, there were 232 million international migrations, which translates into 3.2% of the 
world’s population (United Nations, 2013). Of the 232 million migrants across the world, 136 
million are located in developed countries while the remaining 96 million migrants are in 
developing countries (United Nations, 2013). Although efforts have been made to monitor and 
track trends and changes in global migration, Kahanec and Zimmerman (2008: 4) argue that 
there is an apparent scarcity of migration data (including data which is useful in studying and 
understanding migration issues) which hinders our understanding of the processes causing and 
caused by migration.  
 
International migration patterns have come to be influenced by the growing willingness to work 
abroad. According to Strack, von der Linden, Booker and Strohmayr (2014: 6), the willingness 
to work abroad has come to be seen as “the new normal”. In their study, Strack et al., (2014: 
3) surveyed more than 200 000 people in more than 189 countries28 in order to gauge their job 
expectations, the motivating factors for individuals moving to another country for work, and 
which countries would be favoured as places of employment. Four areas of agreement were 
found among respondents: (1) agreement on the overwhelming willingness to work abroad, (2) 
the importance of broadening one’s personal experience, (3) the interest in receiving “softer 
workplace rewards” and (4) certain work destinations have a greater appeal than others (Strack 
et al., 2014: 4).  
 
                                                          
28 South Africa was one of the countries included in the study where 2047 individuals were interviewed.  
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A total of 64% of the participants indicated they “would be willing to go to another country for 
work”29 (Strack et al., 2014: 6), while participants from developing countries or countries 
which are experiencing political instability were more willing to work abroad. However, there 
was a high willingness to work abroad from participants in some countries that were not facing 
major political upheaval (Strack et al., 2014: 6). The results of the study indicated that English 
speaking countries were the most attractive to move to: the United States of America was the 
most popular country, while London in the United Kingdom was the most popular city to move 
to (Strack et al., 2014: 3). 
 
2.3 The rise of migration in a democratic South Africa  
The persistent conflicts in Africa, such as those in Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, coupled with the rise in political violence and “unconstitutional changes of power” 
have been the cause of great instability for the continent (SANDF, 2014). Further factors 
identified as exacerbating the vulnerability of communities include climate change, disease and 
poverty (SANDF, 2014). These factors have led to a rise in the number of displaced populations 
as seen with the growth in numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across 
the continent and specifically in South Africa.  
 
South Africa’s history of receiving migrants not only from the continent but from other parts 
of the world has led to it being considered a “country of immigration” (Rasool, Botha & 
Bisschoff, 2012: 399). According to Anderson (2006:97), countries which are thought to be 
prosperous and have flourishing economies are the destinations of choice for many migrants. 
In some instances, the number of individuals wishing to immigrate to these countries far 
exceeds the capacity of these countries to accommodate the individuals (Anderson, 2006: 97). 
The SANDF (2014) acknowledges that South Africa remains a haven for foreigners and 
migrant workers due to the perception that the country is able to provide them with conditions 
contrary to the adversity, such as instability and deprivation, they experience in their home 
countries30.  
 
                                                          
29 In South Africa, between 60 and 70% of participants were willing to move to a foreign country for work 
(Strack et al., 2014: 7). Furthermore, in assessing the mobility of job seekers between the ages 21 and 30, 
between 60 and 70% of respondents in this age group were willing to move for a job (Strack et al., 2014: 7).  
30 Also see Majavu (2014: 19) 
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Efforts have been made to address issues relating to migration in the democratic South Africa31. 
One such mechanism to address these issues has been the establishment of a governmental 
department, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), which has been charged with the 
responsibility of “managing the cross border movements of South Africans and non-South 
Africans” (Statistics South Africa, 2013: 8). Further responsibilities of the department include 
the issuing of identity documents, visas and permits, collecting data on all travellers who are 
either arriving in or exiting South Africa as well as determining and granting citizenship32 
(Department of Home Affairs, 2014a) (Statistics South Africa, 2013: 9).  
 
The recognition of South Africa as a migration destination has resulted in an increase in the 
number of foreigners in the country. In 1940, 3 526 immigrants entered South Africa, this 
figure increased to 13 663 in 1950 and, despite fluctuations in the number of foreigners in the 
country, there were 5064 immigrants who entered South Africa in 1995 (SAIRR, 1997: 37-38). 
Between 1940 and 1995, it was estimated that around 1.2 million people immigrated to South 
Africa (SAIRR, 1997: 37-38). 
 
Table 2.1: Immigrants entering South Africa, 1940-1995 
Year Number of Immigrants 
1940 3 526 
1945 2 949 
1950 13 663 
1955 16 684 
1960 9 805 
1965 38 337 
1970 41 523 
1975 50 464 
1980 29 365 
1985 17 284 
1990 14 499 
1995 5064 
Note: This table is derived from the table presented by the SAIRR, 1997.  
Source: (SAIRR, 1997: 37-38). Compiled by author.  
 
In 1996, 5 407 people immigrated to South Africa of which almost 2000 were economically 
driven (SAIRR, 1997:41). Most of the immigrants were from Europe (2 315) while 1 601 of 
                                                          
31 A number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been established in South Africa, orientated around 
providing support to refugees and foreigners in the country. These organisations include, amongst others: the 
African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), the Cape Town Refugee Centre, and the Displaced and 
Migrant Persons Support Program. For a complete list see- http://onesocietyinitiative.org/Refugee-NGO-s/ (The 
One Society Initiative, 2014).  
32 The core functions, mandate, vision, mission and values of the Department of Home Affairs is detailed on 
their official website- http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/index.php/about-us  
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the immigrants were from Africa and 1 137 were Asian (SAIRR, 1997: 41). In addition, 10 545 
applications for asylum refugee status were received with the biggest share being from Africa 
(2 875 from Angola and 2 449 from Zaire33), followed by Asia (1 504), Europe (277) and the 
Middle East (27) (SAIRR, 1997: 49). Over and above the 10 545 applications which were 
received from individuals seeking refugee status, a total of 17 80734 applications for asylum 
were received (SAIRR, 1997: 50). Between 1996 and 2000, the number of emigrations 
exceeded immigrations (SAIRR, 2002: 141). In 2000, the number of immigrants entering the 
country stood at 3 053, which was fewer than the number recorded in 1999 (3 669). A similar 
decline was noted in the number of deportations of illegal immigrants. In 1999, 183 861 illegal 
immigrants were removed from South Africa while in 2000, 145 575 illegal immigrants were 
removed (SAIRR, 2002: 141).  In both these years, Mozambicans accounted for the largest 
number of deportations followed by Zimbabweans (see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: Number of Immigrants and Deportations 
Year/ Period Number of immigrants Number of deportations 
1999 3669 183 861 
2000 3053 145 575 
2001 4832 - 
2002-2004 10 714 - 
2005 - 200 000 
Note: This table is derived from the table presented by the SAIRR.  
Source: (SAIRR, 2007). Compiled by author.   
 
Also noted in 2000 was the large number of immigrants entering South Africa who were not 
economically active35. In 2000, of the 3053 immigrants entering the country, 662 were 
economically active while 2391 were not economically active (SAIRR, 2007: 212). Between 
2001 and 2004, South Africa’s status as a desirable destination for immigration increased as 
noted by the consistent increase in the number of immigrants entering the country annually. In 
2001, 4832 immigrants entered the country. Between 2002 and 2004, a total of 10 714 
immigrants had entered the country (SAIRR, 2007: 44). However, coupled with the increase 
in immigrants entering the country, was the deportation of illegal immigrants. In 2005 alone, 
approximately 200 000 illegal immigrants were sent back to their home countries. Of the 
200 000 illegal immigrants, 77 868 were sent back to Mozambique while other countries 
                                                          
33 In 1997, Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
34 The countries which had the highest number of asylum applications include: Angola (3477 applications), 
other (2945), Zaire (2383), Nigeria (1 849), Somalia (1667), Pakistan (1513) and India (1141).  
35 Categories for immigrants who are considered not to be economically active include: those involved in 
housekeeping, a child, a pupil/student, someone who is labour disabled, a pensioner, a spouse and other.  
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included Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, China and Peru (SAIRR, 2007: 48). Apart from 
the large number of illegal Mozambicans in the country, South Africa has struggled with the 
number of illegal Zimbabweans crossing the border. In 2004, South Africa deported 72 112 
illegal Zimbabwean immigrants. This number increased in 2005 when 97 433 Zimbabweans 
were deported and by June 2006 a further 51 000 illegal immigrants had been sent back to 
Zimbabwe (SAIRR, 2007: 48).  
 
By 2013, Statistics South Africa estimated that there were more than 1.6 million people living 
in South Africa who were not South Africans; i.e. 3.2% of the country’s population. However, 
there are various data sources which argue that there are up to 6 million immigrants in the 
country (SAIRR, 2013: 90).  
 
Various institutions apply different methods and make use of different sets of data to derive 
their figures on the number of foreigners in the country. Over and above the data presented by 
the SAIRR, Statistics South Africa has tracked the number of documented foreigners in South 
Africa using the data from the DHA36.  
 
In 2011 a total of 106 173 temporary residence permits (TRPs) were awarded to foreigners, 
while 10 011 permanent residence permits (PRPs) were awarded (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 
16 & 36). TRPs are granted to those coming to South Africa to visit, for business and work, for 
medical reasons, to study and those on exchange (Statistics South Africa, 2013: 14)37. The 
categories for the issuing of a PRP include: relatives, work, business and finance, retired 
persons and refugees38. In 2012 a total of 141 550 TRPs were processed (Statistics South 
Africa, 2013: 14). Of those who qualified for TRPs, the largest number came from four African 
countries: Zimbabwe, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho39 (Statistics 
South Africa, 2013: 14). In contrast to the high number of TRPs that were issued, only 1 283 
PRPs were issued to foreigners in 2012 (Statistics South Africa, 2013: 29). In 2013, a total of 
101 910 TRPs were processed. Here the top ten countries in terms of permits issued included 
                                                          
36  DHA figures are based on the issuing of permits for both temporary and permanent residency in South Africa 
for the year of focus. 
37 The Department of Home Affairs (2014e) website provides a detailed description of the various TRPs 
available- http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/index.php/types-of-temp-res-permits  
38 Refer to the Department of Home Affairs (2014c) website to see the various categories of PRPs: 
http://www.home-affairs.gov.za/index.php/permanent-res  
39African countries: Zimbabwe (17.2%), Nigeria (10.0%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2.8%) and Lesotho 
(2.7%).  
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Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, India, China and Bangladesh40 
(Statistics South Africa, 2014: 16). In terms of the PRPs, 6801 were issued to individuals from 
countries such as Cameroon, the United Kingdom, Lesotho and Germany which all formed part 
of the top ten countries in terms of permits issued (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 36).  
 
The number of foreigners entering a country, South Africa included, has come to be greatly 
influenced by the existence of regional economic communities (RECs) as can be seen in the 
European Union (EU) and the support for the free movement regime. For South Africa, it is 
the long standing tradition of economic migration from member states of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) which has impacted on the number of foreigners in the 
country (Truen & Chisadza, 2012: i). The data from the SAIRR and Statistics South Africa 
show that SADC member states, such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique, are responsible 
for a significant number of foreigners, legal and illegal, in the country. This can be linked with 
the idea that South Africa provides opportunities which exceed those in the home nations. 
These sentiments are reflected in the findings of Truen and Chisadza (2012: ii) who found that 
approximately 3.3 million people of SADC origin are in South Africa, two-thirds of whom are 
from Zimbabwe41.  
 
In 2013, discussions about the possibility of the creation of a SADC work seeker’s visa were 
undertaken as part of a mechanism to improve the management of asylum seekers and also to 
deal with “the problem of worker migration within the region”, but more specifically to South 
Africa (Ensor, 2013)(Immigration South Africa, 2013). The SADC work seeker’s visa is a 
means by which “a common approach to migration”, can be facilitated resulting in a more 
harmonised set of laws and immigration practices (Ensor, 2013).  
Due to increased media coverage, the SADC work visa and other topics and issues related to 
migration have received a great deal of attention in South Africa (African National Congress, 
2011). In linking migration issues with the rise of a democracy and democratic politics, Hill 
states 
Democracy requires a minimum of consensus on the constitution of the demos, or “people”, and 
transnational migration affects the composition of the demos. In South Africa, transnational 
                                                          
40 Top ten countries in the issuing of TRPs: Zimbabwe, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Angola, India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the United Kingdom (Statistics South Africa, 2014: 17).  
41 The same data is reported in the South Africa Survey 2013 (SAIRR, 2013: 91).  
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migration relates directly to national identity and the vexing issue of “nation building” (Hill, 
1998: 1).  
 
One of the issues to arise and to be given a substantial amount of attention with regard to 
migration is the state of illegal immigration to South Africa (Kotzé & Hill, 1997:5). 
Vigneswaran (2008: 135) argues that illegal immigrants pose a threat to the country, 
specifically its “agendas of political transformation, economic development and broadly 
speaking, modernisation attempts”. This claim is supported by the argument that illegal 
immigrants are a source of competition for South Africans in terms of employment 
opportunities while they are also considered to be “frustrating state efforts to regulate health, 
education and housing sectors” (Vigneswaran, 2008: 135). The basic assumption expressed 
regarding illegal immigration in South Africa is that the poorer citizens of the country’s 
neighbours flocked to South Africa once the country became a democracy and once economic, 
and thus employment, opportunities increased (Vigneswaran, 2008: 142).   
 
As with the number of legal migrants in South Africa, there is great contestation around the 
approximate number of illegal and undocumented foreigners in the country (Vigneswaran, 
2008: 143). In 2009, an article in the Mail & Guardian (2009) reported the controversy 
surrounding the DHA not knowing how many illegal immigrants were in the country. 
According to former DHA Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, obtaining this figure was 
“difficult” and she was quoted saying, “If somebody’s here illegally, how do I know they are 
here?” (Mail & Guardian, 2009).  
 
2.4 Policy development 
This study seeks to investigate the attitudes that South African citizens foster towards 
foreigners in the democratic South Africa, therefore detailing the immigration policies which 
were enforced prior to the 1994 transition is vital as it can be argued that South Africa’s more 
recent immigration policies are a continuation of the apartheid-era policy (Carter, 2010: 3). 
Soon after the country’s transition to a democracy, critics had concluded that the DHA and the 
democratic government failed to make a visible distinction and break from the policy of the 
previous regime (Hill, 1998: 2). Furthermore, the policies and the outcomes thereof under the 
apartheid regime have in some instances come to shape individual’s attitudes and orientations 
towards South Africa’s immigration policy after 1994.  
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For Anderson (2006: 99), attracting low-skilled foreign workers to South Africa through 
temporary migration programmes, changing the country’s ethnic balance by recruiting 
“ethnically desirable immigrants”, and the hesitation and ambivalence of bringing skilled 
workers to South Africa have been instrumental in shaping the country’s immigration policy. 
In briefly discussing South Africa’s immigration policy, Anderson (2006: 99) is able to 
succinctly detail the crux of the country’s immigration policy under the National Party (NP) 
government42.  The biggest shift in the purpose of the policy was seen between 1948 and 1960 
where the party moved from discouraging white immigration to supporting and promoting it 
with the goal of increasing the portion of the South African population that was white 
(Anderson, 2006: 99). Anderson (2006: 100) adds that since 1990 South Africa has moved 
away from a “racially differentiated” policy on immigration, and has seen increased action 
against illegal migrants and an increase in difficulty of legal migration.  
 
Kabwe-Segatti (2008: 60-61), identifies three periods relating to South Africa’s immigration 
legislation. The first period, between 1913 and 1937, is characterised by creating and regulating 
a legal criterion which defines what a foreigner is and sets out how these foreigners are able to 
access the country. The second period, from 1937 to 1986, sees the realignment of the pre-
existing immigration legislation in order to incorporate racist criteria as seen with the support 
for separate economic development. Furthermore, the country’s immigration policy reflected 
the idea of a ‘two-gate policy’: the front gate reflected the willingness to welcome those 
populations who were seen as desirable by the minority in power, while the back gate of the 
policy served two purposes, namely “preventing unwanted migrants from entering” the country 
and ensuring that, even though only on a temporary basis, that cheap and low-skilled labourers 
were let into the country (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008: 60). Lastly, from 1986 to 1994, immigration 
policy displayed a dichotomy between seeking to normalise the immigration legislation within 
the political transformations which were taking place during the period and “the reality of 
deeply entrenched practices” (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008: 61).  
 
The Aliens Control Act of 1991 has been instrumental in governing South Africa’s 
transnational migration, specifically through the 1990s (Hill, 1998: 2) (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008: 
69). According to Kabwe-Segatti (2008: 69), the act was drafted as a means to “unify and 
simplify all previous immigration laws since 1937 as well as to mark a break-away from the 
                                                          
42 Refer to Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion  
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past”. The basis of the act was to determine “the rights and obligations of non-citizens (aliens) 
entering the country” (Kotzé & Hill, 1997: 14). Under this act, three categories of aliens were 
presented: documented (legal) aliens, undocumented (illegal) aliens and refugees. Motivated 
by the weaknesses in the country’s visa system being more apparent, which perpetuated the 
challenge of addressing the issue of illegal aliens in the country, amendments were made to the 
Aliens Control Act in 1995 (Kotzé & Hill, 1997: 14).  
 
Despite the amendments to the Act, it challenged the principles of the 1993 Interim 
Constitution and the 1996 Constitution on numerous principles, and was declared to be 
unconstitutional (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008: 34). After a period of consultation and drafting, the 
new Immigration Act (Act No. 13 of 2002) was introduced in 2002 (Statistics South Africa, 
2013: 8)43. The purpose of the Immigration Act of 2002 is “[T]o provide for the regulation of 
admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from the Republic; and for 
matters connected therewith” (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 2). Subsequently, the Act sets 
out a new system of immigration control, taking numerous considerations into account. One of 
the objectives set out in the Act and to be enforced by the DHA is the regulation of the influx 
of foreigners and residents into South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 14). This 
objective is driven by three goals: (1) promoting economic growth, (2) encouraging skills 
transfers from foreigners to nationals and therefore reducing the dependency that employers 
have on foreigners and (3) facilitating and encouraging family reunification (Republic of South 
Africa, 2002: 14). 
 
The Act placed considerable emphasis on the expansion of South Africa’s economic base. 
According to the South African High Commission (2014), this expansion is made possible by 
attracting those immigrants who are able to contribute positively towards the economy. 
Furthermore, economic growth within the framework of the Act is achieved through promoting 
tourism, supporting the movement of students and academic staff within the SADC, developing 
areas within South Africa which are dependent on the “international exchanges of people and 
personnel”, ensuring that businesses employ foreigners who are in demand, increasing the 
                                                          
43 Statistics South Africa (2013: 8) also asserts that the Citizenship Act No.88 of 1995 has been instrumental in 
influencing the movement of people to South Africa. The Citizenship Act No.88 of 1995 was instrumental in 
establishing categories of citizenship within South Africa. Under the Act, three categories were determined: 
naturalization, birth and descent (Kotzé & Hill, 1997: 14). 
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number of skilled human resources, and lastly by encouraging and enabling skilled and 
qualified people to enter the country (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 14).  
 
In addition to the Act being instrumental in promoting skills immigration, it also sets out the 
categories for those eligible for permanent residence. These categories include: individuals 
who have been holders of a work permit for 5 years, the spouse of a South African citizen or 
resident and children of a South African citizen or resident who are under the age of twenty-
one (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 40). Permanent residency that is issued “on other 
grounds” includes: receiving an offer for permanent employment, where a person has 
extraordinary skills or qualifications, intends to establish a business (a prescribed contribution 
must be made to the business), is a refugee or a retired person, individuals with a predetermined 
net worth who have paid a prescribed amount to the DHA and lastly, the relative of a citizen 
or resident (this is restricted to parents and siblings) (Republic of South Africa, 2002: 42).  
 
The Immigration Act of 2002 faced major criticism due to the lack of consultation during the 
drafting stages, and as a result, the Immigration Amendment Act No. 19 of 2004 and the 
Immigration Regulations of June 2005 were drafted following dialogue and discussions 
between both government and non-government entities (Rasool et al., 2012: 400). According 
to Rasool et al., (2012: 400), the immigration policy influenced the growing shortage of skills 
in the country by being too restrictive and negatively impacting the growth and expansion of 
the economy. Further amendments were evident in the drafting of the Immigration Amendment 
Acts of 2007 and 2011 (Paton, 2014c:4). According to the SAIRR (2012: 91), the 2011 
amendments to the immigration policy did not have any positive effects on the restrictions 
faced by skilled foreigners seeking to enter the country. Section 10 of the Act stated that the 
changing of permit conditions and/or status while in South Africa could only happen under 
“exceptional circumstances” (SAIRR, 2012: 91). This meant that immigrants would, in most 
instances, need to return to their home countries to change the conditions or status of their 
permits (SAIRR, 2012: 91).  
 
In 2014, former Home Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor44 announced that “[I]mmigration needs 
a complete ‘rethink’” (Paton, 2014c: 4). The 2014 amendments sought to address issues 
                                                          
44 Mr Malusi Gigaba took over as Minister of Home Affairs as of the 26 May 2014 (Department of Home 
Affairs, 2014b).  
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relating to lagging efficiency; filling the gaps found in previous policies; and attempting to deal 
with and improve on the abuses to the immigration system, making it “riskier to break visa 
conditions”, and facilitating the inflow of skilled people into South Africa (Paton, 2014c: 4). 
Economic migrants entering the country under the asylum seeking provisions were identified 
as being one of the biggest abuses to the immigration system (Paton, 2014c: 4)45. This was 
made possible given that South Africa grants temporary asylum status to all applicants because 
it is unlawful to “deny anyone the claim and temporary status of asylum-seeker” (Illegal 
immigrants a challenge: Pandor, 2014). The economic migrants therefore use the asylum 
seeking provisions to gain access to South Africa, where they remain illegally (Illegal 
immigrants a challenge: Pandor, 2014)46.   
 
Measures which were put in place to address these loopholes include: those who wish to apply 
for life partner or spousal visa need to provide proof that their partnership has been for more 
than five years, those who overstay a visa are at risk of being “declared ‘undesirable’”47 for 
anything between 2 to 10 years, and holders of a visitor’s or medical treatment visa are not 
eligible to apply for a longer-term visa while in the country (Paton, 2014c: 4). 
 
Further amendments to the policy are seen in the change in processes which allow skilled 
individuals into the country. According to Pandor, the aim of the Act is not to prohibit or deter 
these individuals from entering the country but instead that they “should be able to get visas 
more easily” (Paton, 2014c: 4). This is visible in the introduction of four visa types applicable 
to skilled people wishing to work in South Africa: the intra-company visa, corporate visa, a 
critical skills visa and the general work visa (Republic of South Africa, 2014: 26). According 
to Paton (2014c: 4), the most difficult visa to qualify for will remain the general work visa 
given that those individuals who meet the requirements for this visa are less skilled than those 
who qualify for the other visas. Furthermore, it is those who qualify for the general work visa 
who increase the competition for jobs between South African citizens and foreigners.  
 
Despite the progressive steps outlined in the 2014 Amendment Act to address the inefficiencies 
in South Africa’s immigration system, the Act was not met with open arms and has faced a 
                                                          
45 See also Cronje (2014) 
46 Refer to Sello (2013) and SA News (2013) for more on the management of asylum seekers and policy 
changes.  
47 See the Times Live (2014) article which further elaborates on the penalties attached to overstaying the length 
of the visa- www.timeslive.co.za/local/2014/06/10/penalties-in-sas-new-visa-laws-requirements-for-landlords  
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number of criticisms. One of the criticisms is that the Act is a part of “an ‘Afrophobic’ agenda” 
driven by the goal of seeking to keep Africans out of the country (Cronje, 2014). However, 
members of the DHA responded to and denied these claims (Cronje, 2014). The Act has also 
come under fire for having a negative impact on the current and potential future investments 
into South Africa because the Act “made it much more complicated for professionals to 
conduct business in the country” (Oosthuizen, 2014). Furthermore, the Act was believed to 
challenge family reunification as it makes it harder for “partners of South African citizens to 
remain together” (Oosthuizen, 2014).  
 
Running parallel with the development and amendment of South Africa’s immigration policy 
following the transition to a democracy, we see the worsening of the nature and prevalence of 
violence against foreigners – although not asserting that there is any causal link between the 
two events. The following section provides an overview of a few of the instances of violence 
against foreigners reported in South Africa.  
 
2.5 Violence against foreigners in a democratic South Africa  
One of the first publicised instances of violence against foreigners in the democratic South 
Africa took place in 1998 where two Senegalese and one Mozambican national were 
confronted and attacked by a mob on a train (Zvomuya, 2013). The outcome of the attack was 
the death of all three individuals. While one of the victims, it has been speculated, was pushed 
out of a train, the other two were electrocuted by the power lines as they sought refuge on the 
roof of the train (Zvomuya, 2013). In addition, there was a case in 1998, involving four 
Mozambicans and four police officers in which the police officers recorded the Mozambicans 
being attacked by the police dogs, during a training exercise (Zvomuya, 2013). In this period, 
it was believed that occurrences of xenophobia were on a “small scale” as the targets were 
mainly individual foreign nationals who owned shops in the rural areas (Jost, Popp, Schuster 
& Ziebarth, 2012). However, ten years after the 1998 incidents, South Africa witnessed its 
most widely publicised xenophobic attacks against foreigners residing in the country.  
 
Although there has been less attention given to attacks against foreigners since the 2008 
incidents48 49where more than 60 people were killed and thousands were displaced, the violence 
                                                          
48 Discussed in Chapter 1  
49 Refer to Bekker, Eigelaar-Meets and Eva (2012: 348-374) for more on the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South 
Africa  
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against these individuals has not stopped. In June 2014 it was reported that since the 2008 
attacks on foreigners, more than 900 foreign nationals had been killed in violent attacks driven 
by their origin (Fabricius, 2014). In 2009 further incidents were reported across the country. In 
Durban at the beginning of 2009, two Zimbabwean nationals died following an attack on 
foreigners at a refugee hostel (Holborn, 2010). Around mid-2009, Somali and Ethiopian 
foreigners who owned shops in communities in Cape Town and Mpumalanga were attacked 
and, in October, there were reports of xenophobic sentiments “brewing” in Gauteng (Holborn, 
2010).  In 2011, close to 120 foreigners were killed although not all of them were killings 
driven by xenophobia but rather the result of general crime (Landau, 2013). Included in the 
120 deaths of foreign nationals are the five foreigners who were burnt alive; an example of 
overt violence against foreigners and a manifestation of extreme anti-immigrant sentiments. In 
2012, it was reported that approximately 140 foreigners were killed, “many of them grotesquely 
and intimately”, while around 250 foreigners sustained serious injuries (Landau, 2013). In 
addition, Indian South African shopkeepers were the victims of threats of violence and taunts 
as rioters in Rustenburg referred to the group as ‘makwerekwere’50 (Landau, 2013).  These 
sentiments spread across the country as people of Asian and Indian descent became the victims 
of similar sentiments (Landau, 2013)51.  
 
In 2013, it was reported that at least three major instances of violence against foreigners were 
being reported weekly (Landau, 2013).  In May and June, hundreds of foreign nationals were 
displaced following attacks on their homes and businesses around Gauteng. In the Diepsloot 
and Orange Farm areas, the closure of more than 60 foreign-owned shops was forced following 
the looting and destruction of the properties (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In June and 
September, violence was reported in KwaZakhele and New Brighton in the Eastern Cape where 
Somali nationals were the victims of similar attacks as many shops were left looted and burnt 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). In both instances, no individuals were arrested and charged with 
xenophobic violence but instead were charged with public violence (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). The violence against foreigners continued in 2014. On such incident was the June 2014 
attacks of Somali shopkeepers by South African youth in Mamelodi East, Pretoria. In these 
incidences, two Somali nationals were killed while approximately 100 other individuals were 
                                                          
50 This term was initially used to refer to foreigners from Africa (Landau, 2013).  
51 Refer to Christensen (2013) for a further discussion on the rise of xenophobic violence against minorities in 
South Africa- http://www.afronline.org/?p=30550  
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forced to leave their homes and shops as they sought refuge in a house in Pretoria West 
(Fabricius, 2014).  
 
More recently, the results of the Satisfaction Survey which was conducted in Gauteng, where 
27 493 respondents were interviewed, found that xenophobia was on the increase in the 
province and more specifically in Tshwane (Ispas, 2014). The results of the survey found that 
35% of respondents believed that all foreigners should be sent home and levels of trust and 
racial attitudes were worsening as 73% of Africans agreed that they would never trust whites 
(Ispas, 2014). When tracking the same respondents’ levels of satisfaction with the government, 
it was found that there were generally low levels of satisfaction with governance and the 
government (Ispas, 2014).  
 
Landau (2013) argues that the 2008 xenophobic attacks revealed “two demons” which continue 
to pose a threat to South African society. The first ‘demon’ is said to be embodied in migrants 
as this group remains “an object of suspicion” in light of years of negative discourse regarding 
the migrants and migration (Landau, 2013). Often migrants are perceived as threats to 
transformation, safety and employment as they are identified as thieves and criminals who are 
“set to rob the country and its citizens of their most valuable assets” (Landau, 2013). The 
second ‘demon’ identified is society, or at least the parts of society that are willing to resort to 
violent attacks on people who live peacefully within society. This was noticeable in the overt 
celebrations by the perpetrators of violence who “boasted openly to the global media about 
their actions” (Landau, 2013). The continuance of violence after the 2008 attacks indicates that 
these demons have yet to be tamed and South Africans remain susceptible to negative 
sentiments towards immigrants.  
 
2.5.1 Reasoning violence and xenophobia  
Economic-based reasons have been used to help understand the heightening of negative and 
xenophobic sentiments toward foreigners. The more widely argued position is that foreigners 
are thought of as competition for scarce resources. These sentiments are evident in the 
statement made by the African National Congress (2011), “competition for scarce resources 
since the opening up of democratic space has fostered in our people xenophobic hostility to 
illegal immigrants”. Linked to the worsening of access to scarce resources are the already 
present feelings of resentment, desperation and frustration which are due to the poorer members 
of society facing high levels of economic deprivation.   
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The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi 
cites poverty and inequality as being variables supporting xenophobia. According to Vavi, 
xenophobia is to be taken as a symptom of “deeper levels of resentment among the poor” who 
are looking to put the blame on someone for lagging economic growth and job shortages 
(Radebe, 2013). Holborn (2010) states that it is the desperation and frustration that people feel 
about their situation, which is marked by joblessness, poor service delivery and high crime 
rates, that encourages xenophobia. Thus, these individuals turn to “blaming the most obvious 
scapegoats in their communities” (Holborn, 2010).  
 
Majavu (2014: 19) puts forward both economic and non-economic motivations for xenophobia. 
The economic perspective is premised on two opposing conceptions by immigrants and South 
Africans. From the perspective of immigrants in South Africa, the country, within the African 
context, is viewed as “an island of prosperity and privilege” (Majavu, 2014: 19). It is this 
perception of South Africa which has motivated immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees from 
across the continent to flock to South Africa. However, perceptions on the part of many South 
African citizens are that these immigrants are more of a threat to the privileges of locals 
(Majavu, 2014). It is this perception of immigrants as depriving them of privileges, benefits 
and resources which launched the 2008 xenophobic attacks and the sequent attacks on Somali 
and other black immigrants. The non-economic factor Majavu (2014: 19) refers to is the belief 
that the increasing number of black immigrants in the country threaten and will undermine the 
“black South Africanness”.  
 
Laher (2009), like Majavu (2014), comments on both the economic and non-economic causes 
of xenophobia. According to Laher (2009), possible causes of xenophobia include negative 
beliefs and stereotypes, the perception of a threat to both national and cultural identity, religious 
doctrine and lastly competition for scarce resources such as housing and employment. The 
aforementioned lead to the conclusion that both economic and non-economic factors drive 
xenophobia in the country. 
 
The legacy of apartheid has also been identified as a factor which has driven xenophobic 
sentiments in the country. Adam and Moodley (2013: 37) acknowledge the role deprivation 
has played in reasoning xenophobia but also recognize the role that apartheid has played. They 
state that, “Two guiding ideas inform most South African analyses: that the country’s apartheid 
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past is one root cause of xenophobia, and, more controversially, that the many deficits of the 
post-apartheid state are the other key causes of the problem”. Holborn (2010) argues that racial 
oppression and the legacy thereof has played a role not only in fostering xenophobic sentiments 
but also in encouraging violence against foreigners. She asserts,  
 
[P]erhaps apartheid has instilled a mindset in people about the way in which the lowliest in 
society can be treated that is proving hard to shake off. Maybe the struggle against apartheid has 
created a particularly fiery brand of protest, one that involves violence at times, and so protesting 
against foreigners in a violent way does not seem unusual or unacceptable to some (Holborn, 
2010).  
 
As seen above, a plethora of explanations have been provided as to why xenophobia exists. 
Harris (2002:170) groups these explanations together to form three hypotheses - 1) “the 
scapegoating hypothesis”, “the isolation hypothesis” and “the biocultural hypothesis”. 
Harris (2002: 174) argues that each of these hypotheses provide insight into xenophobia but 
do not sufficiently account for why foreigners, predominately black foreigners, evoke 
violence and hostility in South Africans.    
 
  The first hypothesis, the scapegoating hypothesis, explains xenophobia and hostility 
towards foreigners in terms of limited resources, including education, health care, 
employment and housing (Harris, 2002: 171). The underlying belief is that people “create a 
target to blame for ongoing deprivation and poverty” (Harris, 2002: 171). In the case of 
South Africans, foreigners become the scapegoat as they are identified as a threat to the 
aforementioned limited resources. It is the anger caused by deprivation and the perceived 
threats from foreigners which frustrate South Africans and when that frustration is released, 
foreigners tend to be the scapegoat (Harris, 2002: 171).  
 
 The second hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis, departs from the assertion that the 
scapegoating hypothesis “does not explain why nationality is the determining feature of such 
scapegoating” (Harris, 2002: 172). Instead, this hypothesis characterises xenophobia as 
being a consequence of the seclusion that South Africans experienced during apartheid. Due 
to the seclusion experienced, “foreigners represent the unknown to South Africans” (Harris, 
2002: 172). Therefore, hostility towards foreigners is the result of South Africans being 
isolated from the international community as well as being isolated from one another, 
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internal isolation, during apartheid. It is this isolation which has made it challenging for 
South Africans to tolerate and accommodate difference (Harris, 2002: 173).  
 
 The third hypothesis, the biocultural hypothesis, makes provision for the actuality 
that xenophobia in South Africa is not directed towards all foreigners equally as some 
groups are more likely to be victims of hostility than others (Harris, 2002: 173). In providing 
an explanation “for the asymmetrical targeting of African foreigners by South Africans”, 
xenophobia is explored as being founded in the visible differences or “otherness” that 
African foreigners display (Harris, 2002: 173). Therefore, it is the physical otherness of 
foreigners which makes them distinguishable from locals – the biological-cultural features 
such as accents, hair, dress and physical appearance. The otherness of these individuals aids 
the identification of whom to target (Harris, 2002: 174).  
  
2.5.2 Competition for economic resources in South Africa  
Since competition for scarce resources has been noted as a cause of xenophobia and negative 
orientations towards foreigners, it is essential that a contextualization of the country’s 
economic conditions, specifically its employment conditions, is provided.  
 
One of the biggest threats that foreigners are posing to South Africans is the access to 
employment and other opportunities to earn a salary. Within the home-based sector of the 
economy, shops that are run by foreigners are “out-competing locals” which translates into a 
loss of business and future opportunities to commence operating within the home-based sector 
(Paton, 2014a: 1-2). This loss of opportunities is evident given that 33% of the South African 
labour force is employed within the informal sector which, when coupled with the number of 
unskilled or semi-skilled individuals in South Africa, heightens the pressure to find 
employment within this sector (SANDF, 2014). Furthermore, in South Africa we find that 
foreign migrants have a higher rate of employment (81%), compared to South Africans whose 
rate of employment is 65% (Paton, 2014b). According to the outcomes of a study by the African 
Centre for Migration and Society, “Foreign migrants in South Africa have a greater chance of 
employment than locals, although they work mainly in the low-paid, informal jobs” (Paton, 
2014b).  
 
In 1996, a number of immigrants were affected by the loss of jobs in the mining, construction 
and manufacturing sector given the migrant labour system which mainly operated on the mines 
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(SAIRR, 1997: 662). Despite the loss of jobs in these three sectors, job opportunities increased 
from 4.95 million in 1994 to 5.4 million by September 1996 (SAIRR, 1997: 663). Between 
1997 and 2001, a decline in the labour force absorption rate52 occurred as the rate went from 
79.0% of the WAP being employed in 1997 to 73.6% in 2001. However this change can be 
explained by the increase in the size of the labour force which was greater than the number of 
people employed (see Table 2.3)  
 
Table 2.3: South Africa’s employment capacity, 1997-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This table is derived from the table presented by the SAIRR, 2002.  
Source: (SAIRR, 2002: 210). Compiled by author.   
 
Between 1994 and 2006, according to the strict definition of unemployment, there was a 28.0% 
increase in the unemployment rate (SAIRR, 2007: 149). Between 2006 and 2013, the country’s 
unemployment increased from 23.1% in 2006 to 25.6% in 2013 (SAIRR, 2013: 265).  
In addition to the increase in unemployment, we see a growth in the levels of poverty as 
measured by those living under $1 a day. Between 1996 and 2005 there was a 122.6% increase 
in the portion of South Africans living on less than $1 (SAIRR, 2007: 149).  
 
2.6 Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants: Previous study outcomes  
Marking the rise of migration as an issue on the international agenda has been the increase in 
literature and studies covering the topic. Based on various motivations, studies have been 
undertaken with the purpose of uncovering perceptions and attitudes toward not only 
immigrants but also to the process of migration.  
 
Kleemans and Klugman (2009) undertook one such study which seeks to provide an 
understanding of attitudes towards migrants. Their findings are derived from the data of the 
2005/2006 wave of the World Values Survey completed in 52 countries including South Africa 
(countries included are inclusive of the different levels of human development, income 
                                                          
52 This measures the portion of the labour force that is employed.  
53 This comprises only of those South Africans who are economically active  
54 Number of individuals employed in both the informal and formal sectors of the economy  
 Labour force53 Total employed54 Labour force absorption rate 
1997 11 698 000 9 247 000 79.0% 
1998 12 553 000 9 390 000 74.8% 
1999 13 527 000 10 369 000 76.7% 
2000 15 794 000 11 715 000 74.2% 
2001 16 077 000 11 837 000 73.6% 
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groupings and are from all continents) (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009: 3). The study identifies 
three dependent variables: (1) orientations towards immigration policy as seen through what 
respondents believe government should enforce regarding migration, (2) employment priority 
and the questioning of whether priority is to be given to nationals over foreigners when jobs 
are scarce and lastly, (3) immigrants as neighbours where respondents are asked whether they 
would mind having immigrants as neighbours (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009:4).  
 
The overall finding of the study is that “people are generally tolerant of minorities and have a 
positive view of ethnic diversity” while also finding that when jobs are limited, people tend to 
favour nationals receiving the employment opportunities over the foreigners (Kleemans & 
Klugman, 2009: 9, 12). When testing the relationship between tolerance and employment 
priority, they found that those who value tolerance are more positive about migration in terms 
of employment preference and allowing foreigners to compete for jobs (Kleemans & Klugman, 
2009: 17).  
 
Further findings relating to individual characteristics such as level of education, age, gender 
and employment are also presented. They found that higher levels of education are linked to 
more positive attitudes towards foreigners while societies where there is high inequality and 
high levels of unemployment have more negative attitudes within the lower educated end of 
society (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009: 17). In addition, all the variables relating to self-reported 
income and social class have a positive association with migration. Younger people are more 
likely to have positive opinions about migration and immigrants and males are more inclined 
to favour allowing migrants into the country while women support equality within the job 
market (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009: 17-18).  
 
Jewell, Melgar, Molina and Rossi (2009: ii) undertook a similar study by seeking to analyse 
attitudes towards foreigners from a cross-country perspective by examining not only individual 
characteristics of respondents but also “country-specific effects”. Unlike Kleemans and 
Klugman (2009) who use the World Values Survey, Jewell et al. (2009: 6) derive their findings 
from the International Social Survey Program which was conducted in 2003. Although more 
than 44 000 individuals were surveyed across 33 countries, the final conclusions were based 
on the responses of 30 343 respondents in 31 countries. South Africa was one of the countries 
where data existed but was excluded due to a lack of responses for all the questions posed. 
Jewell et al., (2009: 8) conclude that respondents with higher levels of education are more 
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likely to be positive about immigration. In addition, unemployment can be linked to more 
negative attitudes. Jewel et al., (2009: 8) find that positive attitudes are more likely in those 
who are single than those as respondents who are married or separated and positive attitudes 
towards immigrants are also linked to people with higher income levels, people who are not 
citizens of the country where the study was completed and urban dwellers (Jewel et al., 2009: 
8). Finally, Jewell et al. (2009: 9) found that education, specifically a university education, has 
the largest impact on attitudes towards immigrants.  
 
The study by Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2013: 326) questions the drivers of individual 
attitudes towards immigration in South Africa: economic or non-economic factors. The non-
economic factors include age, gender, race, social class, political and political party affiliation 
and religion; while the economic determinants are derived from measures of the respondents’ 
skills based on data of the level of education and occupation (Facchini et al., 2013: 330). Based 
on the data of the World Values Survey for the years 1996, 2001 and 2006 they found that 
“immigration is very widely opposed” and that this opposition has increased between 1996 and 
2006 (Facchini et al., 2013: 339). With regard to the economic and non-economic determinants 
of attitudes towards immigration, they found that the non-economic factors are more likely to 
explain the change in attitudes than the economic factors. These include race, social class, 
gender and age which were most important in shaping attitudes towards immigration (Facchini 
et al., 2013: 339).  
 
Interestingly, the findings of Facchini et al.(2013) and Jewell et al.(2009) contradict each 
another. While Jewell et al. (2009) finds education (an economic factor) to have the biggest 
impact on attitudes towards immigrants, Facchini et al. (2013) highlights the dominance of 
non-economic factors.  
 
Carter (2010), on the other hand, seeks to examine the nature of tolerance in South Africa by 
examining and exploring the attitudes toward foreigners within South Africa. The findings of 
this study are drawn from the results of the fourth Afrobarometer survey55 which was 
                                                          
55 The Afrobarometer is a project which seeks to measure “attitudes towards democracy, governance, civil 
society, and markets” through the conducting of public opinion surveys across the African continent (Carter, 
2010: 2).  
Given the sample size selected (2400 respondents), the survey is based on a nationally representative selection 
of all South African citizens over the age of 18 (Carter, 2010: 2).  
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conducted in South Africa between October and November of 2008 (Carter, 2010: 2). From 
the data, three key findings are presented.  
First, the majority of South African citizens do not trust foreigners: 60% of respondents 
said that they do not trust foreigners at all while 23% said that they only trust foreigners in 
South Africa a little bit (Carter, 2010: 1). In treating not at all and just a little as response 
categories indicative of a lack of trust in foreigners, it was found that 83% of South Africans 
did not trust foreigners (Carter, 2010: 2).  
Second, close to two-thirds (64%) of respondents would choose to restrict the entry of 
foreigners (Carter, 2010: 2). This percentage consists of respondents who would prohibit all 
foreigners from entering the country (24%) and the 40% who would choose to place restrictions 
on the number of foreigners allowed to enter the country (Carter, 2010: 3). Tolerance is 
measured using the abovementioned opinions on immigration and the respondents’ opinions 
on what the policy should be for deportation. It was found that South Africans “overwhelming 
support strict immigration protocols” (Carter, 2010: 3). With regard to tolerance of foreigners 
from a provincial overview, it was found that people in Mpumalanga are the most tolerant of 
foreigners, while people in Gauteng and the Northern Cape are the least tolerant (Carter, 2010: 
5). Findings on tolerance and race show that close to one-third of white South Africans (32%) 
support the view that foreigners should be prohibited from entering the country compared to 
23% of coloured and blacks and 13% of Asians (Carter, 2010: 6).  
Third, South Africans are “dissatisfied with the way government handles immigration” 
as 63% of respondents answered “very” or “fairly badly” when questioned on how well or 
badly the former Mbeki government was managing immigration (Carter, 2010: 7).  
 
In 2013, a further study was undertaken by Mataure (2013) using the Afrobarometer data56 in 
order to gauge citizens’ perceptions on migration in South Africa through assessing attitudes 
towards asylum seekers, attitudes towards foreigners and employment opportunities, tolerance 
towards African foreigners57, trust in foreigners, migration and citizenship and evaluations of 
government’s management of immigration. Two points are similar to the findings presented by 
Carter (2010). Firstly, it was found that trust in foreigners has decreased. In 2008, 60% of 
respondents said they do not trust foreigners and in 2011 this increased to 67%. Similarly was 
                                                          
56 Data from Round 5 of the surveys conducted in South Africa in October and November of 2011. As with the 
2008 data, it is based on a nationally representative random sample of 2400 South Africans from all nine 
provinces (Mataure, 2013: 1).  
57 Measured through asking respondents what the likelihood is of them taking part in action to prevent African 
migrants who are in the country from moving in and operating a business in their neighbourhoods  
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the poor evaluation of government’s management of migration as Mataure (2013: 6) found that 
almost two-thirds (63%) of respondents give government a bad evaluation.  
 
Furthermore Mataure (2013: 3-7) found that more respondents believe that protection should 
not be given to asylum seekers (44%) as opposed to those who are in support of South Africa 
being a place of refuge when foreigners are being persecuted in their home countries (38%). In 
addition, more respondents hold the belief that foreigners should not be allowed to live in South 
Africa because they take away jobs and benefits from the native population: 45% say foreigners 
should not be allowed into South Africa, while 39% of foreigners say they should be allowed 
into the country. Mataure (2013: 4) concludes that there was an increase (between 2008 and 
2011) in the tolerance for living and working in close proximity to foreigners. In 2008, 59% of 
respondents would not prevent foreigners from moving into their neighbourhood but by 2011, 
66% shared these sentiments.  
 
du Toit and Kotzé (2011), who dedicate their book to the theme of peace and democracy in 
South Africa, devote a chapter to studying the rise of violence against foreigners where specific 
reference is made to the attacks of 2008. According to du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 159), the 
outbreak of violence in 2008 was a low point in South Africa’s journey toward a liberal and 
peaceful society. Using the data from the 2006 wave of the WVS as well as the elite study, the 
chapter focuses on the extent of public and elite tolerance, thus the level of dislike of foreigners 
in addition to their degree of support for a number of policy options relating to foreigners 
seeking work in South Africa (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 159).   
 
An initial, and interesting observation made by du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 162) is that the 2006 
data of the WVS was unable to predict the violent outbreaks that occurred in 2008 as the data 
indicated high levels of tolerance amongst respondents. According to the data, South Africans 
were “generally tolerant of ‘immigrants/foreigners’” as represented by the 75.1% of South 
Africans who were open to accepting foreigners as their neighbours (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 
162). When assessing the level of tolerance by social class, along the spectrum from lower to 
upper class, the levels of tolerance were still reasonably high despite those in the upper class 
reporting higher levels of tolerance as opposed to those in the lower class (du Toit and Kotzé, 
2011: 163).  
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Further findings include South Africans generally being unsupportive of the presence of 
foreigners in the country. This is indicated by the extensive support for policies which advocate 
for rigid limitations on entry to the country and policies which stipulate that entry to South 
Africa is to be prohibited while considerably less support was given to policy options which 
promote open entry into South Africa (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 164). Relating to policy 
options, it is found that there is no significant differences on the basis of social class and race, 
with the exception of the support for the option of complete prohibition of foreigners into the 
country (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 165). Here the data shows that approximately one in ten 
Indians (10.9%) support prohibition of foreigners while about one in three Black South 
Africans (32.0%) advocate for the stringent policy option (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 165).  
There is very little variation in the results of men and women as well as the results of religious 
and non-religious people (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 167).  
 
When drawing conclusions on elite attitudes towards foreign workers and immigrants, it is 
found that the results of the elites mirror those of the upper class South African as they report 
“almost identical” levels of tolerance towards foreigners (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 167). Media 
elites are the most tolerant group of elites while business elites are an entire 20 percent lower 
than the media elite (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 167).  
 
Ultimately, du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 170) conclude that there was a disjuncture between 
orientations and sentiments towards foreigners and the xenophobic outbursts, that the dislike 
of foreigners (measured by views on policy) is evenly dispersed across the South African 
population while tolerance is not as evenly spread across society as lower class South Africans 
are least likely to accept foreigners as their neighbours (du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 170).  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
Migration has arisen as an important topic within the international domain. South Africa is one 
such country that has had a long history of receiving migrants and thus migration remains an 
important topic on the political agenda of the country. Coupled with the increase in the number 
of foreigners entering the country and the changes in South Africa’s economic and political 
climate, the immigration policy has been developed and amended in accordance with goals in 
each of these contexts.  
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Despite the development and amendment of the country’s policy, South African citizens have 
fostered a deeply entrenched dislike of foreigners, specifically those residing in the country. 
This is most obvious in the number of instances of violence against foreigners. Competition 
for scarce resources and the legacies of apartheid have been identified as common explanatory 
factors for why nationals have developed such negative orientations towards foreigners.  
 
Following the rise of migration, studies have been conducted to uncover the attitudinal 
orientations of native citizens towards immigrants. The findings of these studies show that 
attitudes are complex and are affected by a multitude of dimensions relating to both economic 
and non-economic factors. The studies conducted in South Africa indicate that South Africans 
hold seemingly negative attitudes towards foreigners as measured by dimensions such as 
tolerance, trust and perceptions of the country’s immigration policy.  
 
Chapter Three will discuss the methodology and research design employed in this study as well 
as discussing the four dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners by introducing the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of each dimension.   
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
The rising number of foreigners in the country has been met with the obvious and prolific 
spread of xenophobic sentiments which has resulted in concerns related to migration. Most 
studies conducted in South Africa have been focussed on the violence inflicted on foreigners 
(Carter, 2010: 1). More specifically, the 2008 xenophobic attacks raised serious questions about 
the flow of people across transnational borders and issues around identity and citizenship 
(Carter, 2010: 1). This study asserts that underlying behavioural manifestations, such as 
xenophobic violence are certain attitudes which shape an individual’s orientations, perceptions 
and responses to issues relating to migration and migrants. This study seeks to assess the 
attitudes of South Africans towards foreigners by investigating four dimensions of such 
attitudes: social tolerance, interpersonal trust, employment preference and attitudes towards 
migration.  
 
The data from the last four waves of WVS conducted in democratic South Africa will be 
utilised in order to assess whether the dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners have changed 
over time. This chapter therefore seeks to outline the research design and methodology.  
 
3.2 Longitudinal research  
Longitudinal research is best understood as allowing for the comparison of data from different 
periods in time in order to ascertain the extent to which change, if any, has taken place 
(Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008: 61)(Bryman, 2012: 712). Menard (1991: 4) 
defines longitudinal research as,  
[R]esearch in which (a) data are collected for each item or variable for two or more distinct time 
periods; (b) the subjects or cases analyzed are the same or at least comparable for one period to 
the next; and (c) the analysis involves some comparison of data between or amongst periods 
(Menard, 1991: 4).  
 
Derived from the definition of longitudinal research, two purposes of this form of research 
are identified. Firstly, longitudinal studies are to “describe patterns of change” which have 
been noticed and secondly, they establish the direction and magnitude of causal 
relationships (Menard, 1991: 5). According to Menard (1991: 5), these patterns of changes 
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can be measured according to either chronological time or age. The descriptive nature of 
this study is embedded in its longitudinal assessment. This rests on the position that the first 
phase in any longitudinal assessment of data involves the describing of the data and the 
results of the diachronic study (Menard, 2008: 8).  
 
Within longitudinal studies, branches and different permutations of the study are found. One 
such example is trend studies. Trend studies involve studying the changes within a 
population group over time (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 93). This study prescribes to this by 
focusing on the changes in attitudes of the South African population over the age of 16.  
 
Despite the usefulness of longitudinal studies in tracking changes over time, this form of 
research is not without fault. The cost of longitudinal research (time, money and energy) 
and collection of data are factors which act as a deterrent. In seeking to analyse the data 
collected, some of the statistical procedures required may be considered “complex and 
unfamiliar”, which results in another challenge (Rajulton, 2001: 172). Lastly, the lack of or 
restricted access to longitudinal information is a further challenge (Rajulton, 2001: 172).  
Despite the problems outlined above, longitudinal studies remain valuable given their ability 
to “show the nature of growth, trace patterns of change, and possibly give a true picture of 
cause and effect over time” (Rajulton, 2001: 171). Thus, these studies are useful in 
highlighting and studying periods of transition within the sphere of study. In addition, the 
data derived from longitudinal studies has become instrumental in grappling with the 
complexities linked to social processes given that such data is useful in establishing 
temporal order, creating and strengthening casual interpretations and measuring the nature 
of change within variables (Rajulton, 2001: 171).   
 
This study seeks to overcome some of the challenges posed by longitudinal studies by 
making use of secondary data analysis. This form of data analysis is useful in mitigating the 
issues such as the time and money involved in data collection as well as the problem of 
panel and respondent attrition.  
 
3.3 Secondary data analysis  
Secondary data analysis is a method which has been employed in the field of research in order 
to avoid and reduce the tedious and costly processes related to deriving data, such as survey 
work (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 264). While primary data analysis sees those who collected the 
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data analyse it, secondary data analysis allows for researchers who were not involved in the 
process of data collection to analyse the collected data (Church, 2001: 32). Secondary data 
analysis is suited to analysing both qualitative and quantitative data and for the purpose of this 
study, secondary data analysis will be used to analyse the latter.  
 
Vartanian (2011: 13-14) outlines the benefits of applying secondary data analysis to a research 
study. These include being cost-effective and taking less time to organize, having complete 
access to relative primary data, the available data covering an array of topics, being able to 
make use of reputable data sets such as the WVS and being able to make use of data sets which 
have a representative sample size thus allowing for richer observations (Vartanian, 2011: 13-
14). Bryman (2012) elaborates on some of the points introduced by Vartanian (2011) and 
proposes further benefits of secondary data analysis. Like Vartanian (2011), Bryman (2012: 
312) argues that secondary analysis allows for the accessing of good quality data for a fraction 
of the resources (time and money) involved in data collection. Furthermore, he concurs that 
one of the benefits of secondary analysis is the use of high-quality data sets which are both 
reputable and have also followed rigorous procedures relating to sampling (Bryman, 2012: 
313).  
 
In addition, and the most advantageous to this study, Bryman (2012: 313) states that secondary 
data analysis allows for longitudinal analysis where similar data is collected over time. 
Furthermore, secondary data analysis allows for the analysis and study of sizeable sub-groups 
which might have been harder if attempted independently, it allows for cross cultural analysis 
and research, the lack of data collection results in more time for data analysis, it allows for an 
array of interpretations of the data, and secondary data analysis widens the obligations for 
social researchers (Bryman, 2012: 314-315).  
 
Despite the advantages, there are also limitations associated with using secondary data. 
 First, one of the more serious problems faced by researchers who use secondary data is 
that the data only approximates the kinds of data preferably employed to test hypotheses 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2007: 279)58.       
 Second, is the problem of access which relates to the challenge of either finding data 
archives which contain the variables necessary for the study or not having access to the relevant 
                                                          
58 Bryman (2012: 316) identifies this as the “absence of key variables”.  
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data in the hands of an investigator not wanting to release the data (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2007: 279).            
 Third, secondary data analysis may prove challenging to a researcher if there is 
insufficient information available on how the data was collected as such information is needed 
to determine whether there are any biases, errors or problems (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2007: 279).            
 Fourth, the lack of immediate familiarity with the data lengthens the process of data 
analysis as “a period of familiarization” with the data is necessitated (Bryman, 2012: 315). 
 Lastly, the complexity of the data (relating to the number of respondents and variables) 
and the lack of control of the data quality may pose further challenges to secondary data 
analysis (Bryman, 2012: 315-316).  
 
These challenges have been overcome by: (1) having open access to the WVS data. All WVS 
is available online and while the 2013 wave is still under embargo, access to the data was 
possible by working in close proximity with the principal investigator; (2) the technical reports, 
which detail the processes followed in the data collection process, were easily accessible, which 
helps to overcome the issue of a lack of information on how the data has been collected, and 
(3) familiarity of the data was ensured by working with the WVS data prior to this study which 
has been useful in overcoming the complexity of the data.  
 
In order to complete secondary data analysis, one needs to make use of tools and programmes 
which are designed to analyse the data. One such programme is the statistical and analytical 
programme, The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). SPSS is a “comprehensive 
and flexible statistical analysis and data management solution” (Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences, 2014). SPSS is a tool which assists in providing a summary of the data, compiling 
tables and graphs, examining relationships between variables, testing for statistical significance 
given the research hypotheses and lastly, it is useful in developing “sophisticated” models 
(Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 583). 
 
3.4 Description of datasets  
The WVS is an internationally renowned research project which examines not only the values 
and beliefs of the individual but also the stability or volatility of such values and beliefs. 
Furthermore, the project seeks to explore the impact that such values and beliefs have on the 
advances and occurrences in the social, cultural, political and economic sphere of societies 
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across the world (WVS, 2014). The broad topics covered by the WVS include support for 
democracy, electoral integrity, tolerance and trust, the role of religion, the impact of 
globalization and perceived individual well-being (WVS, 2014). From the topics covered, 
values such as those relating to religion, gender, family, work, leisure time, politics and 
economics can be derived (Kotzé & Harris, 2007).  
 
The study depends on a conglomerate of social scientists from around the globe who are 
responsible for administering surveys in their country59. In order to monitor long-term changes 
in values and beliefs, six waves of surveys were administered between 1981 and 201460 in 
almost 100 societies globally. The societies involved in the WVS account for approximately 
90% of the world’s population (WVS, 2014). For each wave, the survey is based on a 
standardised questionnaire and is completed by a representative sample based on the national 
population (WVS, 2014).  
 
The value of the WVS far exceeds its usefulness in the research domain as the findings of the 
data collected have been used, not only by researchers, but by policy makers, government, 
scholars and students, international organisations and journalists (World Value Survey, 2014).  
 
In adhering to the prescription of longitudinal studies, this study draws on the data from the 
last four waves of the WVS which were conducted in South Africa in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 
2013. The selection of the waves of survey data, between 1996 and 2013, is motivated by the 
purpose of the study: to assess the changes in attitudes towards foreigners subsequent to South 
Africa’s transition to a democracy which took place in 1994. Due to the WVS being structured 
along the use of standardised questions in each wave, the longitudinal study of attitudes towards 
foreigners in South Africa is optimised as questions are likely to appear in the succeeding wave.  
 
3.5 Number of respondents and sampling methods61 
In the four waves of the surveys under investigation, face-to-face interviews were conducted 
in the place of residence of the respondents. Interviews were conducted in English, Afrikaans, 
                                                          
59 The Principal Investigators (PI) for South Africa who were responsible for the four waves to be  covered in 
this study are: 1996 –Hennie Kotzé and Mari Harris, 2001-  Hennie Kotzé and Mari Harris, 2006- Hennie Kotzé 
and Mari Harris, and 2013- Hennie Kotzé.   
60 Wave 1:1981-1984, Wave 2: 1990-1994, Wave 3: 1995-1998, Wave 4:1999-2004, Wave 5: 2005-2009, Wave 
6:2010-2014.  
61 All details on the sampling procedures and sample size are made available in the World Values Technical 
Reports which are released with the data sets online. See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp,    
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Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana and Sotho by Ipsos South Africa in order to accommodate respondents 
through allowing better understanding of the questions (Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2009: 15).  
Probability/random sampling  was utilised. This is a sampling procedure where each member 
of the population being studied has “an equal and independent” chance of being selected in the 
sample (Kumar, 2011: 199). Thus, the selection of one of the elements of a sample is not 
dependent on another element (Kumar, 2011: 199). In ensuring that the sample selected is 
nationally representative, the study draws respondents from the South African population who 
are 16 years and older where everyone in this category has an equal chance of being selected 
(Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2009: 13). Given that the sample is weighted according to the full size 
of the population and that within a statistical margin of error of less than 2% with a 95% 
confidence level, it can be stated that the sample selected was representative of the adult 
population of South Africa (Kotzé & Steenekamp, 2009: 13). 
 
In 1996, the total number of respondents surveyed was 2 899, where the sample was organised 
along racial lines and was spread across all nine of South Africa’s provinces. Three thousand 
individuals were surveyed in 2001 where the sample began to reflect a nationally representative 
sample of all racial groups. Furthermore, the sample was representative of the urban and rural 
populations, i.e. 60 percent of respondents were from metropolitan centres and 40 percent were 
from towns, villages and urban areas (Steenekamp, 2011: 83).  In 2006, the sample selected 
was stratified62 into sub-groupings based on province, gender, race and community size (Kotzé 
& Steenekamp, 2009: 13). The total number of respondents (N) in 2006 was 3 000 respondents. 
In 2013, 3 531 respondents formed the nationally representative sample selected using 
probability sampling.   
 
3.6 Dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners  
Supported by the selection of variables in the studies by Carter (2010), Mataure (2013), 
Facchini et al. (2013), and Kleemans and Klugman (2009), this study identifies four 
dimensions of attitudes63 towards foreigners within the WVS across the four waves. The 
dimensions identified include:  (1) social tolerance towards foreigners; (2) interpersonal trust 
                                                          
62 Stratification refers to the subdividing of a population into subpopulations which are “mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive” (Frankel, 2010: 98). Thus, the population being sampled, in this case all South Africans over the age 
of 16, is divided into distinctive and divergent subpopulations (Frankel, 2010: 98).  
63 The question relating to interpersonal trust does not appear in the survey until 2006 therefore only 3 
dimensions are studied in 1996 and 2001.  
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(trust in foreigners64 and those of another nationality65); (3) employment preference and (4) 
attitudes towards migration. It is these four dimensions that will structure the discussion on 
South African’s attitudinal orientations towards foreigners.  
 
3.6.1 Dimension one: Social tolerance  
3.6.1.1 Conceptualisation of tolerance66  
Tolerance is defined as being able to “put up with the objectionable” or more simply to be 
“putting up with” (Weisberg, 1998:16). Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1993:2) define 
tolerance as “a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or opposes”. According to 
Accept Pluralism67 (2013: 17), tolerance is to be defined as the “non- interference with 
practices or forms of life of others even if one disapproves of them”. Overall tolerance requires 
two aspects: non-interference and non-discrimination (Accept Pluralism, 2013: 17)68.  
 
Given that tolerance can be understood in various contexts, distinctions can be drawn between 
the different permutations of tolerance. For example, political tolerance which has emerged in 
the context of political science, is distinguishable from social tolerance. Thus while tolerance 
is indeed individualistic and psychological in nature, its counterpart, political tolerance, is 
rather indicative of society’s inclinations and orientations (Weisberg, 1998: 39).  
 
The importance of not only social tolerance but tolerance in general is embedded in it being “a 
necessary precondition, although not a sufficient one, for democracy by itself, regardless of 
context” (Accept Pluralism, 2013: 13). This will be further discussed in chapter 4 as it relates 
to social cohesion.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 This variable only appears in the 6th wave of the WVS (2013)  
65 This variable appears in both the 5th (2006) and the 6th wave (2013) of WVS  
66 Conceptualization is a definition which is able to describe a specific concept through the use of other concepts 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2007: 29)  
67Accept Pluralism is a project funded by the European Commission under their Seventh Framework 
Programme. The aim of the project is to determine whether European societies have become more tolerant or 
intolerant over the past twenty years (European University Institute, 2013).  
68 Refer also to UNESCO’s Declaration of Principles on Tolerance where Article 1 elaborates on the meaning 
of tolerance. See: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13175&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (UNESCO, 1995).  
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3.6.1.2 Operationalisation of tolerance69    
The level of tolerance that respondents have for foreigners is measured by asking: On this list 
are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as 
neighbours? Here the group presented to respondents is Immigrants/Foreign Workers. The 
question has two response categories: mentioned and not mentioned. Those respondents who 
mentioned that they would not like immigrants or foreign workers as neighbours are defined 
and measured as being intolerant while those respondents who did not mention it are tolerant.  
 
3.6.2 Dimension two: Interpersonal trust 
3.6.2.1 Conceptualisation of interpersonal trust  
The value of trust rests in it being “necessary for people to live together, cooperate with each 
other, and coordinate efforts and behaviour” (Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011: 874). Despite a 
lack of consensus about how to define trust, agreement has been reached on the perception that 
trust implies a positive outcome or “expectation towards another person’s behavior” (Righetti 
& Finkenauer, 2011: 874). A proposed definition of trust is “a person’s ‘expectations, 
assumption, or belief about the likelihood that another’s future actions will be beneficial, 
favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s interests’” (Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011: 874).  
In order for trust to exist, three elements need to be present: interdependence, risk and free 
choice. Interdependence refers to the need for there to be a reliance on another person in order 
for a specific outcome to be met while risk alludes to a person realising that the potential exists 
for something to be lost if the other party involved does not “act favourably” (Righetti & 
Finkenauer, 2011: 874). Lastly, free choice implies that people choose to make themselves 
vulnerable through their reliance on another party in order to achieve the best possible outcome 
or to withdraw (Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011: 875).  
 
More specific to this study, interpersonal trust is instrumental in shaping human relationships 
across all spectrums. Interpersonal trust can be defined as “a generalized expectancy held by 
an individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group 
can be relied on” (Rotter, 1980: 1). 
 
  
                                                          
69 Operationalization is the description of the procedures which will be followed “in order to establish the 
existence of the phenomenon described” by the conceptual definition (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2007: 
29).  
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3.6.2.2 Operationalisation of interpersonal trust  
Interpersonal trust is measured by asking respondents of the WVS the following question: 
Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not 
very much or not at all? Of the groups presented to respondents, this study focuses on what 
respondents had to say about people of another nationality and immigrants/ foreign workers.  
Respondents were able to choose from four of the ordinal categories: trust completely, trust 
somewhat, do not trust very much and do not trust at all. The first two response categories are 
indicative of more positive levels of interpersonal trust while the latter two categories represent 
negative levels of trust. The ‘don’t know/refused’ answers were excluded from the analysis 
and treated as discrete missing values70.  
 
3.6.3 Dimension three: Employment preference  
3.6.3.1 Conceptualisation of employment preference  
The dimension of employment preference is underpinned by the belief that South Africans are 
more deserving or entitled to employment opportunities. The inclusion of this measure is 
beneficial to this study as a great deal of the contestation and outcry around the influx and 
presence of foreigners in South Africa is orientated around the idea that foreigners are a threat 
to access to economic resources as they are competition for employment opportunities (Paton, 
2014b) (African National Congress, 2011).  
 
3.6.3.2 Operationalisation of employment preference 
Employment preference is measured by asking respondents if they agree or disagree with the 
statement: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to South African people over 
immigrants. Three response categories are presented to the respondents of the WVS- (1) Agree, 
(2) Neither agree nor disagree, (3) Disagree. For the purpose of this study, “don’t know” is 
excluded and treated as a missing value. 
 
3.6.4 Dimension four: Attitudes towards migration  
3.6.4.1 Conceptualisation of attitudes towards migration  
The core element embedded in attitudes towards migration is the belief that the government 
should place restrictions on foreigners wishing to enter the country (Mataure, 2013:1). Such 
                                                          
70 Trust in people of another nationality: 2006, 2.1% of respondents answered refused/ don’t know and in 2013 it 
was 5.5%. 5.4% of respondents answered refused/don’t know when questioned on trust of foreign 
workers/immigrants.  
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orientations often range from welcoming all foreigners to prohibiting all foreigners from 
entering the country (Carter, 2010: 3).  
 
While it is possible that measuring attitudes towards migration is driven by the inclination to 
measure the respondent’s views on foreigners gaining entrance to the country, Carter (2010: 3) 
argues that studying attitudes towards migration is a useful measure of the level of tolerance 
which respondents have towards foreigners. This is done through categorising respondents as 
either tolerants71 (those who say that foreigners are welcome) and restrictionists72 (limit or 
prohibit foreigners) (Carter, 2010: 4).  
 
3.6.4.2 Operationalisation of attitudes towards migration  
Attitudes towards migration are gauged by asking respondents: How about people from other 
countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should 
do? Four response categories are presented to respondents: (1) Let anyone come who wants to, 
(2) Let people come as long as there are jobs available (3) Place strict limits on the number of 
foreigners who can come here, (4) Prohibit people coming here from other countries. As with 
the other dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners, the ‘don’t know/ refused’ responses are 
treated as missing values and are excluded from the analysis73.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
The research design and methodology employed in measuring the longitudinal changes in 
attitudes are not without limitations. However, these limitations can be overcome. Four 
dimensions: social tolerance, interpersonal trust, employment preference and attitudes toward 
migration will be used to analyse the overall trends in attitudes towards foreigners in South 
Africa from 1996 until 2013. These findings are based on the secondary data analysis of four 
waves of WVS survey data for the years 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2013.  
 
Chapter Four will present the findings of the longitudinal changes in attitudes towards 
foreigners in South Africa by assessing the changes in the four abovementioned dimensions. 
                                                          
71 Respondents who believe that government should let anyone in and that government should let people in as 
long as there are jobs available (Carter, 2010: 4).  
72 Respondents who assert that the government should “prohibit people from entering from other countries” and 
those who believe that strict restrictions should be placed on the number of foreigners allowed to enter the 
country (Carter, 2010: 4).  
73 Percentage of don’t know/refused excluded- 1996: 3.0%, 2001: 4.1%, 2006: 4.1%, 2013: 3.9%.  
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These findings will be elaborated on by the discussion of the post-apartheid landscape in South 
Africa.  
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Chapter 4: Dimensions of Attitudes towards Foreigners in South Africa 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The value of studying attitudes towards foreigners, as I propose to do through assessing trends 
in four dimensions of such attitudes, far exceeds its intrinsic value as such findings are useful 
in evaluating a broad spectrum of national efforts such as nation building, social cohesion and 
even policy reformulation. Combining the investigation of dimensions of attitudes toward 
foreigners with cross-tabulations of individual characteristics or attributes, strengthens the 
understanding of which sub-groups within South Africa carry certain attitudinal orientations 
towards foreigners and how these have changed over time. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the chapter will present the longitudinal findings 
of the four dimensions. Seven independent variables will be introduced in order to analyse the 
influence that individual characteristics have on the four dimensions of attitudes. Secondly, 
this chapter will take a deeper look at the findings presented and provide possible explanations 
for any trends reported.     
 
4.2 Understanding variations in attitudes towards foreigners  
The findings from the studies by Jewell et al. (2009) and Facchini et al. (2013)74 regarding the 
impact of economic and non-economic factors on attitudes towards immigrants motivates the 
selection of a combination of economic and non-economic factors to gauge their impact on the 
trends in the four dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners. This study selects both economic 
factors (employment status, education and financial satisfaction) and non-economic factors 
(race, gender, social class and generalized trust) as independent variables75 against which the 
trends between 1996 and 2013 will be analysed.  
 
The economic and non-economic independent variables were operationalised as follows:  
                                                          
74 Discussed in Chapter 2 under Section 2.6- Attitudes towards Immigration and Immigrants- Previous Study 
Outcomes 
75 Dependent variables are those variables that depend on or are caused by another or other variables (these 
variables are the independent variables of a study) (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 641). 
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Race7677: The racial grouping of the respondents was recorded based on the observation of the 
interviewer. Respondents were categorised as 1=Black, 2=White, 3=Coloured, or 
4=Indian.  
 
Gender/Sex of respondent: The gender or sex of the respondent was measured on a two point 
scale: 1=Male and 2= Female  
 
Employment status: In order to gauge employment status, respondents were asked, Are you 
currently employed or not? Response categories were 1=Yes (employed) and 2=No 
(unemployed). The 1996 response categories were recoded according to the response 
categories presented in 2001, 2006 and 2013.  1=Yes (employed) included full-time, 
part time and self-employed response categories and 2=No (unemployed) included the 
unemployed, student, housewife and retired/pensioner response categories. All other 
response categories were treated as missing as with the ‘other’ response category in 
the 2013 survey. 
 
Education: Measured by asking respondents, What is the highest educational level that you 
have attained? The response categories were recoded into 1=No School, 2= Primary 
School (primary school incomplete and completed), 3=High School (High School 
incomplete and completed) and 4=University (some university and completed). All 
other response categories were treated as missing values. 
 
Perceived social class: Measured by asking respondents, People sometimes describe 
themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower 
class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the …?. The response categories 
were recoded and collapsed- 1=Lower Class included the lower class + working class, 
2=Middle Class included lower middle + upper middle class and 3=Upper class 
remained the same. 
 
Generalised trust: Measured by asking respondents, Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
                                                          
76In the waves, where Other response category is included, it is treated as a missing value. 
77 The WVS makes use of the widely used fourfold categorisation of race. Such categories are social 
constructions and do not necessarily reflect my beliefs on the categorisation of people on the basis of race. 
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The data in the 2006 and 2013 wave were recoded into a two point nominal variable 
where respondents either believe 1= Most people can be trusted or 2=Need to be very 
careful  
 
Financial satisfaction: Respondents were asked, How satisfied are you with the financial 
situation of your household? The responses were captured on a scale of 1 to 10 where 
1= Completely dissatisfied and 10 = Completely satisfied. 
 
4.3 Attitudes towards foreigners 
This study rests on the conceptual understanding that attitudes are linked to an individual’s 
behaviour. This understanding of attitudes in the context of the rise of anti-immigrant 
sentiments in South Africa has motivated the investigation of attitudes towards foreigners in 
the country. Furthermore, the rise of issues relating to migration becoming more prominent in 
the democratic South Africa has served as a motivator for the selection of the period of 
inquisition for the longitudinal study. Measuring attitudes towards foreigners is undertaken by 
investigating the changes in four dimensions: social tolerance, interpersonal trust, employment 
preference and attitudes toward migration, which have been identified as being instrumental in 
shaping attitudinal orientations.  
 
4.3.1 Trends in social tolerance  
In order to measure the change in levels of social tolerance in South Africa between 1996 and 
2013, respondents in all four waves of WVS were asked, “On this list are various groups of 
people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” This 
study focuses specifically on how respondents perceived immigrants/foreign workers. The 
responses were coded on a two-point scale: (1) mentioned, intolerant; and (2) not mentioned, 
tolerant.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the change in the levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers 
between 1996 and 2013. The figure shows the growth of intolerance towards foreign workers 
and immigrants following the country’s transition to a democracy. In 1996, the lowest level of 
intolerance towards foreign workers/ immigrants was documented, as less than a quarter of 
respondents (21.1%) mentioned that they would not want foreign workers/ immigrants as their 
neighbours. By 2013, the level of intolerance had almost doubled to 40.9%. 
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Figure 4.1: Tolerance towards immigrants/ foreign workers, 1996-2013 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
According to UNESCO (2014a), the shift from tolerance to intolerance is evident in the 
movement away from respect and appreciation to endorsing and relying on violence and, 
marginalizing and discriminating against individuals and groups.  
 
The level of intolerant respondents increased by 8.4% while the percentage of intolerant 
respondents shifted from 21.1% in 1996 to 29.5% in 2001. The upward trajectory in intolerance 
was not, however, continued between 2001 and 2006 as the percentage of intolerant 
respondents declined from 29.5% to 24.9%. The period between 2006 and 2013 was 
characterised by a significant increase in the percentage of intolerant respondents, the highest 
level of intolerant respondents (40.9%) across all four waves of the WVS. This finding is 
contrary to the findings presented by Mataure (2013: 4), who found that between 2008 and 
2011 there was an increase in the level of tolerance for living and working in close proximity 
to foreigners.  
 
4.3.1.1 The impact of the independent variables on social tolerance 
Tables 4.1 to 4.7 add to the descriptive nature of this study by assessing the trends in social 
tolerance according to various groups and factors within South African society. Table 4.1 
allows us to make a number of descriptive observations about the trends in social tolerance 
amongst males and females in South Africa between 1996 and 2013.  
 
1996 2001 2006 2013
Intolerant 21,1 29,5 24,9 40,9
Tolerant 78,9 70,5 75,1 59,1
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Table 4.1: Tolerance by gender, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Table 4.1 shows that while the greatest portion of respondents (both male and female) are 
tolerant of foreigners across the four waves, there is a significant increase in the level of 
intolerance amongst males and females. For both, the levels of intolerance doubles between 
1996 and 2013, which is expected given the overall trend in social tolerance.  
 
The data indicates that there is little variance between males and females, therefore gender does 
not have a significant impact on social tolerance.  
 
Table 4.2: Tolerance by race, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of social tolerance according to the four racial groups in South 
Africa. Overall, Blacks remain the most intolerant of foreign workers and immigrants up until 
2006 whereas from 2013 Indians become the most intolerant group. Furthermore, we see that 
the percentage of tolerant respondents declines across all racial groups.  
  
In 1996, Black South Africans (23.9%) were the most intolerant towards foreign workers and 
immigrants followed by Coloureds (23.3%). Although the percentage of intolerant Indian and 
White respondents increased significantly from 1996, Blacks remained the most intolerant 
group in 2001. By 2006, the data showed little variation amongst Black, Coloured and Indian 
respondents while the White population were the most tolerant. 2013, however, was marked 
by a general decline in the levels of tolerance toward foreign workers/immigrants.  
 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Male  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Intolerant 20.6 21.6 32.0 26.7 25.5 24.3 41.8 40.1 
Tolerant  79.4 78.4 68.0 73.3 74.5 75.7 58.2 59.9 
 
1996 2001 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Intolerant 23.9 8.9 23.3 8.5 32.4 22.5 19.8 25.4 
Tolerant  76.1 91.1 76.7 91.5 67.6 77.5 80.2 74.6 
RACE 
2006 2013 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Intolerant 26.3 14.8 23.9 23.5 40.1 45.5 37.6 56.7 
Tolerant  73.7 85.2 76.1 76.5 59.9 54.5 62.4 43.3 
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Interestingly, when looking at the split in the percentage of respondents in each category across 
the four racial groups, more than half of the respondents indicated they are tolerant of foreign 
workers/ immigrants. The only exception is seen in 2013, amongst the Indian respondents, 
where 56.7% mentioned the group ‘foreign workers/immigrants’. Furthermore, when assessing 
the longitudinal trends in levels of tolerance amongst Indians, it is noticeable that this group 
shifted from being the most tolerant group in 1996 (91.5% tolerant) to the least tolerant group 
in 2013.  
 
Table 4.3: Tolerance by employment status of respondent78, 1996-2013 (column 
percentages)  
EMPLOYMENT 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Intolerant 19.3 22.6 30.6 28.6 23.8 25.5 38.1 42.5 
Tolerant  80.7 77.4 69.4 71.4 76.2 74.5 61.9 57.5 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
The data in Table 4.3 shows that in 1996, 2006 and 2013, those respondents who were 
employed were most tolerant of foreign workers and immigrants. Despite this finding, there is 
very little difference in the levels of tolerance or intolerance between those respondents who 
were employed and those who were unemployed.   
 
Table 4.4 introduces tolerance from the perspective of respondents with varying levels of 
education. The data shows that there is only a marginal difference in the level of tolerance 
amongst the respondents who had no schooling and either primary or high school education 
within each wave. Thus, the biggest outlier are those respondents who had a university 
education as they recorded the highest percentage of tolerance towards foreign workers and 
immigrants across all four waves.  
 
Despite those respondents with a university education having the highest levels of tolerance 
towards foreign workers and immigrants, looking at the longitudinal changes from 1996 to 
2013, it is evident that the number of intolerant respondents close to quadrupled from 9.7% to 
34.2%. Therefore, while those with some university qualification remained more tolerant when 
compared to respondents with lower levels of education, the percentage of intolerant 
respondents with a university qualification has increased over time.   
                                                          
78 Yes denotes that the respondent was employed while No denotes that the respondent was unemployed 
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Table 4.4: Tolerance by education, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Table 4.5 allows us to make a number of descriptive observations about the trends in tolerance 
amongst respondents who perceive themselves as belonging to either the lower, middle or 
upper class. The assumption is that respondents who identify as upper class are more likely to 
be tolerant than the middle and lower class respondents. Contrary to this assumption, the data 
shows a shift from the upper class being the most tolerant group of respondents in 1996, where 
93.7% of respondents were tolerant of foreign workers/ immigrants, to 2013 where upper class 
respondents were the most intolerant respondents across the classes.  
 
Table 4.5: Tolerance by social class, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Intolerant 23.1 17.7 6.3 30.6 25.1 57.5 
Tolerant  76.9 82.3 93.7 69.4 74.9 42.5 
 
2006 2013 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Intolerant 26.3 24.4 25.3 39.4 44.6 47.8 
Tolerant  73.7 75.6 74.7 60.6 55.4 52.2 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
From the data presented in Table 4.6, two important points can be drawn. Firstly, there is an 
insignificant difference in the level of tolerance and intolerance between those respondents 
who believe that people can be trusted and those who believe that one needs to be careful. 
Secondly, the data shows that respondents who were more trusting of people recorded higher 
levels of intolerance than those respondents who were generally more wary of trusting people. 
This finding challenges the assumption that one is more likely to tolerate those one trusts.  
 
 
EDUCATION 
1996 2001 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Intolerant 21.1 24.3 21.8 9.7 36.2 31.5 31.6 22.0 
Tolerant  78.9 75.7 78.2 90.3 63.8 68.5 68.4 78.0 
EDUCATION 
2006 2013 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Intolerant 26.3 26.0 25.8 15.4 44.8 38.9 42.2 34.2 
Tolerant  73.7 74.0 74.2 84.6 55.3 61.1 57.8 65.8 
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Table 4.6: Tolerance by generalized trust, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
In terms of financial satisfaction, where 1 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means 
completely satisfied, the mean scores of both intolerant and tolerant respondents have moved 
away from being more dissatisfied in 1996 (4.11 for intolerant respondents and 4.26 for tolerant 
respondents) to more satisfied by 2013 (5.97 for intolerant respondents and 6.24 for tolerant 
respondents) (see Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7: Tolerance by financial satisfaction of respondent, 1996-2013 
Response Category 
Mean financial satisfaction 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Intolerant 4.11 4.59 5.58 5.97 
Tolerant  79 4.26 4.69 5.68 6.24 
Total 4.23 4.66 5.66 6.13 
Note: The mean is to be read as being the average financial satisfaction of respondents. Financial satisfaction is 
read on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is completely dissatisfied and 10 is completely satisfied  
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Despite this, the data shows that in each wave it was respondents who tolerated foreign workers 
and immigrants who were more satisfied with their financial situation than intolerant 
respondents.  Therefore tolerance can be linked to higher financial satisfaction.  
 
4.3.2 Trends in interpersonal trust  
In accordance with Righetti and Finkenauer’s (2011: 874) conceptualisation of trust, the 
presence of trust indicates that one party views the “future actions” of another party as not 
negatively impacting on their interests and pursuits. Following from this, interpersonal trust 
embodies the ability of one party to rely on another individual or group’s actions and words 
(Rotter, 1980: 1). The lack thereof is associated with the weakening of social dynamics and 
interaction in addition to breaking down the social fabric (Rotter, 1980: 1).  
                                                          
79 Intolerant here refers to all respondents who mentioned, while tolerant respondents were those who did not 
mention foreign workers/ immigrants 
TRUST 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Intolerant 24.0 20.0 30.6 29.7 29.2 24.1 44.0 40.0 
Tolerant 76.0 80.0 69.4 70.3 70.8 75.9 56.0 60.0 
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In order to gauge the levels of interpersonal trust, respondents were asked: “Could you tell me 
for each whether you trust people from this group?” Of the groups presented to respondents, 
this study focuses on responses to people of another nationality and immigrants/ foreign 
workers. Four response categories were presented to the respondent: (1) trust completely, (2) 
trust somewhat, (3) do not trust very much (4) do not trust at all.  Table 4.8 illustrates the 
longitudinal trends in trust in people of another nationality and immigrants/foreign workers in 
2006 and 2013.  
 
Table 4.8: Interpersonal trust for 2006 and 2013 
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
When assessing the overall levels of trust80 and distrust81 in 2006 and 2013, there was little 
difference between those who were trusting and those who were distrusting of people of 
another nationality. In 2006, 49.0% of respondents were trusting while 51% of respondents did 
not trust people of another nationality compared to the 49.4% of respondents who were trusting 
and the 50.6% of respondents who were not trusting in 2013. Therefore, the change in overall 
trust and distrust of people of another nationality between 2006 and 2013 was insignificant.  
Respondents were, however, less trusting of ‘foreigners/ immigrants’. It must be noted that 
‘foreign workers/immigrants’ are those who have moved to South Africa with the purpose of 
working and/or living here, while ‘people of another nationality’ refers in general to people 
who are not from South Africa. The higher level of distrust of foreign workers/ immigrants is 
apparent in the 6.3% of respondents who completely trust this group as opposed to the 11.2% 
of respondents who trust people of another nationality. Furthermore, the findings of the overall 
levels of trust and distrust show that of these two groups, half the respondents (50.6%) do not 
trust people of another nationality, while more than two-thirds of respondents (67.4%) do not 
trust foreign workers/ immigrants.  
                                                          
80 Overall trust is measured by combining the totals of the ‘Trust completely’ and ‘Trust somewhat’ response 
categories.  
81 Overall levels of distrust are measured by combining the totals of the ‘Do not trust very much’ and ‘Do not 
trust at all’ response categories.  
 
Another 
Nationality 
Another 
Nationality 
Immigrants/ 
Foreign Workers 
 
2006 2013 2013 
Trust completely 6.8 11.2 6.3 
Trust somewhat 42.2 38.2 26.3 
Do not trust very much 37.6 31.6 30.7 
Do not trust at all 13.4 19.0 36.7 
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4.3.2.1 The impact of the independent variables on interpersonal trust 
Tables 4.9 to 4.15 strengthens the descriptive nature of this study by assessing the trends in 
interpersonal trust according to both economic and non-economic factors. Table 4.9 allows us 
to make a number of descriptive observations about the trends in interpersonal trust among 
males and females in South Africa between 1996 and 2013.  
 
Table 4.9: Interpersonal trust by gender, 2006-2013 (column percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Looking at the trends in trust of people of another nationality between 2006 and 2013 we see 
that in both waves the largest percentage of respondents (both male and female) stated that they 
somewhat trust people of another nationality followed by do not trust very much. In 2006, more 
males were completely trusting of people of another nationality than females but in 2013, this 
is inverted as females became more trusting. The data indicates that in both waves there is very 
little variation in interpersonal trust across the gender groups indicating that gender does not 
have a significant impact on interpersonal trust.   
 
Furthermore, assessing the levels of interpersonal trust in 2013 between people of another 
nationality, and foreign workers and immigrants we see that both male and female respondents 
were less trusting of the latter group.  
 
Table 4.10 summarises interpersonal trust amongst South Africa’s four racial groups. The data 
shows that Blacks were the most trusting of people of another nationality in the 2006 and 2013 
waves of the WVS. However, despite Black respondents being the most trusting of people of 
another nationality in 2006 we see that they were also the most distrusting of people of another 
nationality.  
 
 
 
 
People of another nationality Foreign worker/Immigrant 
2006 2013 2013 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Trust completely  7.6 6.0 10.9 11.4 6.0 6.6 
Trust somewhat 40.1 44.3 37.7 38.7 24.9 27.6 
Do not trust very much 39.2 35.9 32.2 30.9 31.1 30.4 
Do not trust at all 13.1 13.7 19.2 18.9 38.1 35.5 
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Table 4.10: Interpersonal trust by race, 2006-2013 (column percentages) 
 
People of another nationality  
2006 2013 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Trust completely  7.2 5.7 4.7 6.3 12.7 7.3 3.7 5.2 
Trust somewhat 38.8 60.4 49.1 54.1 38.6 37.3 34.7 41.8 
Do not trust very much 39.8 25.1 32.2 35.5 30.3 40.0 31.7 31.0 
Do not trust at all 14.2 8.8 13.9 4.2 18.4 15.4 29.8 22.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Assessing the trends in the 2013 data, it is interesting to note that Indians had the highest 
levels of trust completely and do not trust at all when compared to the other four race groups.  
 
Table 4.11 summarises the results of interpersonal trust by employment status. By comparing 
the 2006 and 2013 data, we see that there were higher levels of complete trust of people of 
another nationality in 2013 amongst both employed and unemployed respondents than in 2006. 
Between 2006 and 2013, the percentage of unemployed respondents who completely trust 
people of another nationality more than doubled from 5.4% to 11.4%. Furthermore, in both 
waves the unemployed respondents had higher levels of distrust of people of another nationality 
than those respondents who were employed.  
 
Table 4.11: Interpersonal trust by employment status of respondent, 2006-2013 (column 
percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Foreign worker/ Immigrant 
2013 
Black White Coloured Indian 
Trust completely  7.1 3.5 2.0 7.7 
Trust somewhat 26.9 27.5 23.2 12.0 
Do not trust very much 30.2 33.1 32.6 29.8 
Do not trust at all 35.8 35.9 42.2 50.5 
 
People of another nationality 
Foreign worker/ 
Immigrant 
2006 2013 2013 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Trust completely  9.0 5.4 10.6 11.4 6.1 6.4 
Trust somewhat 45.5 40.1 42.2 36.0 29.4 24.6 
Do not trust very much 35.8 38.7 30.3 32.3 29.1 31.5 
Do not trust at all 9.7 15.7 16.9 20.3 35.4 37.5 
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Comparing the levels of trust of people of another nationality (2013) and foreign 
workers/immigrants, the data shows that both employed and unemployed respondents were 
less trusting of foreign workers/immigrants than people of another nationality.  
 
Table 4.12 illustrates that in both waves respondents who had either begun or completed their 
university education were more trusting82 of both groups (people of another nationality and 
foreign workers/ immigrants). Interestingly, none of the respondents with no schooling 
completely trust foreign workers or immigrants while 53.8% did not trust this group at all. 
 
Table 4.12: Interpersonal trust by level of education, 2006-2013 (column percentages)  
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Table 4.13 allows us to make descriptive observations about interpersonal trust amongst three 
self-perceived social classes. Assessing interpersonal trust of people of another nationality, the 
largest percentage of respondents over all three social classes were found in the response 
category Trust somewhat in 2006. In 2013, the largest percentage of respondents in the lower 
and middle class somewhat trusted people of another nationality while the upper class 
respondents Do not trust at all people of another nationality. The 2013 results for trust of 
foreign workers/ immigrants indicated that across all three social classes, the greatest 
percentage of respondents do not at all trust foreign workers/ immigrants.  
                                                          
82 This is a combination of the percentages of the ‘Trust completely’ and ‘Trust somewhat’ response category.  
 
People of another nationality 
2006 2013 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Trust completely  12.7 5.7 6.7 7.7 2.6 9.3 11.5 12.5 
Trust somewhat 38.1 40.8 41.1 57.5 39.3 32.7 38.6 40.5 
Do not trust very much 37.6 38.3 38.0 23.6 33.7 32.2 32.3 24.5 
Do not trust at all 11.5 15.2 14.1 11.2 24.5 25.8 17.6 22.5 
 
Foreign worker/Immigrant 
2013 
No 
School 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Trust completely - 6.4 6.5 5.6 
Trust somewhat 21.6 19.7 25.4 30.7 
Do not trust very much 24.6 32.0 31.2 28.0 
Do not trust at all 53.8 41.9 36.9 35.8 
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Table 4.13: Interpersonal trust by social class, 2006-2013 (column percentages) 
 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
The data presented in Table 4.14 challenges the assumption that those who believe that people 
can be trusted would report higher levels of interpersonal trust. In 2006 the data shows that 
there were more respondents with low levels of generalized trust (believed one needs to be 
careful when dealing with people) who completely trust people of another nationality than 
respondents with higher levels of generalized trust. However, it was also found that respondents 
with lower levels of generalised trust also had the lowest levels of trust in people of another 
nationality.  Looking at the respondents in the 2006 wave with the highest levels of generalised 
trust, we see that the majority of them (46.1%) only somewhat trust people of another 
nationality although one would expect them to completely trust this group.  
 
Table 4.14: Interpersonal trust by generalised trust, 2006-2013 (column percentages) 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Further findings which challenge the assumptions about generalised trust and interpersonal 
trust is seen in 2013. The data shows that the majority of respondents who believe that  people 
can be trusted, for both people of another nationality and foreign workers/immigrants, 
answered, for these groups, that they Do not trust very much. Furthermore, the majority of 
respondents with low generalised trust said that they somewhat trust people of another 
nationality and do not trust at all foreign workers/immigrants.  
 
 
People of another nationality 
Foreign Worker/ 
Immigrant 
2006 2013 2013 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Trust completely  6.9 5.3 17.3 11.6 9.8 24.3 5.5 8.0 12.4 
Trust somewhat 39.5 45.2 41.0 37.8 40.2 22.7 25.7 27.9 26.0 
Do not trust very much 38.5 38.3 34.2 31.2 32.7 23.0 31.5 28.7 19.4 
Do not trust at all 15.1 11.2 7.6 19.5 17.3 30.0 37.3 35.5 42.2 
 
People of another nationality 
Foreign Worker/ 
Immigrant 
2006 2013 2013 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to 
be careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Trust completely  6.3 6.9 12.1 10.9 7.4 6.0 
Trust somewhat 46.1 41.5 36.3 38.9 30.0 25.1 
Do not trust very much 36.7 37.8 36.7 29.9 31.8 30.3 
Do not trust at all 10.9 13.9 14.9 20.3 30.8 38.5 
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The final set of data, outlined in Table 4.15, assesses interpersonal trust from the perspective 
of the financial satisfaction of respondents. The data shows that between 2006 and 2013, 
looking at trust of people of another nationality, there was an increase in the financial 
satisfaction of respondents across all response categories except trust completely. Therefore 
the financial satisfaction of those respondents who completely trust people of another 
nationality has declined from 2006 (7.05) to 6.26 in 2013.  
 
Table 4.15: Interpersonal trust by financial satisfaction of respondent, 2006-2013 
 
People of another Nationality Foreign worker/ Immigrant 
Mean financial satisfaction Mean financial satisfaction 
2006 2013 2013 
 
Trust completely 7.05 6.26 6.13 
Trust somewhat 6.14 6.25 6.30 
Do not trust very much 5.27 6.14 6.09 
Do not trust at all 4.85 5.89 6.08 
Total 5.70 6.15 6.14 
Note: The mean is to be read as being the average financial satisfaction of respondents. Financial satisfaction is 
read on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is completely dissatisfied and 10 is completely satisfied 
Source: WVS 2006; 2013. Compiled by author. 
 
Comparing the mean scores for the two groups in 2013 (people of another nationality and 
foreigners/immigrants), those respondents who Trust completely and those who Do not trust 
very much people of another nationality are more satisfied with their financial situation than 
respondents who Trust completely and Do not trust very much foreigner workers/immigrants. 
Within the remaining two response categories (Trust somewhat and Do not trust at all) higher 
mean scores are recorded in the trust of foreigner workers/immigrants. Therefore the financial 
satisfaction of those respondents who Trust somewhat and Do not at all trust foreign 
workers/immigrants is higher than the financial satisfaction of respondents who Somewhat 
trust and Do not at all trust people of another nationality. 
 
4.3.3 Trends in employment preference  
In seeking to measure the orientations of respondents toward employment preference, the 
following question was posed: “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to South 
African people over immigrants?” The list of responses presented to respondents are: (1) Agree, 
(2) Neither agree nor disagree, (3) Disagree. Table 4.16 illustrates the longitudinal trends in 
employment preference between 1996 and 2013.  
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Table 4.16: Employment preference for South Africans, 1996 -2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
The data shows the movement from a vast majority of respondents (83.3%) believing that 
preference should be awarded to South Africans over foreigners in 1996 to just about half of 
the respondents (50.6%) in 2013.  
 
Interestingly, the biggest shift across all response categories was noted between 2006 and 2013 
as the number of respondents who believed that priority should be given to South Africans 
decreased significantly (by 27.7%), while the number of respondents who were neutral and 
those who believed that no priority should be awarded to native citizens increased by 17% and 
10.6% respectively.  This finding challenges the assumptions that following the global financial 
crisis83, citizens would want to reserve available employment opportunities for native citizens. 
According to the 2006 and 2013 WVS data, following the crisis, citizens were more open to 
equal opportunity of available jobs than before the economic downturn.  
 
4.3.3.1 The impact of the independent variables on employment preference 
Tables 4.17 to 4.23 proves useful in assessing the trends in employment preference according 
to economic and non-economic factors. Table 4.17 summarises employment preference by 
gender. The trend in the data matches the general trend in employment preference; thus there 
is no significant variance by gender. The data shows that from 2001 onwards females are more 
likely to disagree with the awarding of employment preference to South Africans. This finding 
supports the one made by Kleemans and Klugman (2009: 17-18) as they found that women are 
bigger supporters of equality between foreigners and locals in the job market. 
 
                                                          
83 The financial crisis began following the crash of Lehman Brothers in the United States of America in September 
of 2008 which is believed to be the largest case of bankruptcy in the United States of America ever (van Beek, 
2011: 14) (Fox, 2009). Following the crash, a new credit-rating system was introduced as state-owned institutions, 
which provided support for mortgages on residential property, began carrying the credit risk of potential and 
current home owners (du Plessis, 2011: 26-27). Following weaknesses in the new credit rating system, sub-prime 
mortgages were introduced which made credit more accessible to people who would previously not have been 
eligible (du Plessis, 2011: 28). The low interest rates introduced resulted in many pivotal banks and financial 
institutions having to close down (du Plessis, 2011: 29). It is believed that the spill-over effect from one institution 
to another played the most important role in perpetuating the financial crisis. Given that modern financial systems 
require a dependency on international counterparts, the financial crisis could not be contained in the United States.  
 1996 2001 2006 2013 
Agree 83.3 76.4 78.3 50.6 
Neither agree nor disagree 7.0 13.5 10.7 27.7 
Disagree 9.7 10.1 11.0 21.6 
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Table 4.17: Employment preference for South Africans by gender, 1996-2013 (column 
percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Assessing employment preference by race, (Table 4.18), we note similar trends as found in 
Table 4.17. Over all four waves, more than 50% of respondents over all four racial groups 
reported that they Agree that employment priority should be awarded to South Africans. The 
only instance where this was not found is in 2013, where only 47.1% of black respondents 
answered in favour of employment preference. 
 
Table 4.18: Employment preference for South Africans by race, 1996-2013 (column 
percentages)  
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Looking at the breakdown by race we see that in 1996, 2001 and 2006 it was the Coloured and 
Indian respondents who recorded the highest percentage of respondents who agree with the 
employment preference statement. Interestingly, we see that Blacks were most opposed to 
giving preference to South Africans over foreigners. This finding challenges one of the core 
assumptions made in this study as some of the biggest contestation and uproar regarding 
foreigners depriving South Africans of employment opportunities has been from Black South 
Africans.  
 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Agree 82.6 83.9 80.6 71.8 78.1 78.5 52.0 49.3 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
7.2 6.8 10.6 16.7 11.1 10.2 28.4 27.1 
Disagree 10.2 9.3 8.8 11.5 10.8 11.3 19.6 23.6 
 
1996 2001 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Agree 82.0 84.6 90.3 89.8 72.1 82.1 92.4 95.5 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
7.9 5.7 2.2 4.7 16.7 6.3 4.4 1.6 
Disagree 10.1 9.8 7.4 5.5 11.2 11.6 3.1 2.9 
 
2006 2013 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Agree 76.5 83.6 87.5 87.9 47.1 60.4 61.9 72.6 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
11.7 5.9 7.7 4.0 29.5 23.0 22.6 14.5 
Disagree 11.7 10.5 4.9 8.1 23.4 16.6 15.5 12.9 
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Looking at the data presented in Table 4.19, we see that the trends in employment status are 
almost identical to gender. Therefore, there is no significant variance in employment preference 
by employment status. However, this finding is surprising as one would assume that 
employment status would have an impact on the respondents’ orientations towards 
employment preference.   
 
Table 4.19: Employment preference for South Africans by employment status of 
respondent, 1996-2013 (column percentage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
From the data assessing employment preference by level of education (Table 4.20), one can 
argue that respondents who have either a partial or complete university education or have no 
schooling are more likely to agree that employment priority should be given to South Africans 
over foreigners.  
 
Table 4.20: Employment preference for South Africans by level of education, 1996-2013 
(column percentages)  
 
1996 2001 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Agree 85.3 84.4 82.8 77.9 85.0 82.5 79.6 85.5 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
5.6 7.4 7.0 8.6 9.8 7.6 9.2 5.5 
Disagree 9.1 8.1 10.2 13.5 5.2 9.8 11.2 9.0 
 
2006 2013 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High School 
University 
No school 
Primary School 
High 
School 
University 
Agree 72.6 75.8 79.2 80.9 64.1 51.4 51.0 53.1 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
16.0 12.1 10.3 4.4 18.2 28.4 27.1 25.9 
Disagree 11.4 12.2 10.4 14.7 17.7 20.2 21.8 21.0 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
This conclusion is derived from the findings that, in 1996, the highest percentage of 
respondents who agree were those with no formal schooling and those with some level of 
primary schooling. Furthermore, in 2001 and 2013 it was those groups with No formal 
schooling and either a partial or complete University qualification that had the highest 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Agree 86.1 81.2 79.6 73.9 77.8 78.6 50.6 50.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 5.4 8.2 10.3 16.0 10.3 10.9 30.4 26.3 
Disagree 8.5 10.6 10.1 10.1 11.9 10.5 19.0 23.1 
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percentage of respondents who agree. In 2006, respondents who had some schooling or have 
completed High school and those with some degree of a University qualification had the highest 
percentage of respondents who agree. Thus, across the four waves, the groups with No 
schooling and a University level education appear to have the highest percentage of respondents 
who are in support of employment preference as compared to the other two levels of education. 
 
Table 4.21 allows us to make a number of descriptive observations about employment 
preference amongst lower, middle and upper class respondents. The data shows us that the 
majority of lower, middle and upper class respondents, in all four waves, support preference 
being awarded to South Africans over foreigners; however this support wanes over time.  
 
Table 4.21: Employment preference for South Africans by social class, 1996-2013 
(column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Agree 84.3 80.6 86.0 75.6 79.1 70.0 
Neither agree nor disagree 6.8 7.5 4.9 15.9 9.6 18.7 
Disagree 8.9 11.8 9.1 8.5 11.3 11.3 
 
2006 2013 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Agree 81.2 72.2 88.6 51.0 51.1 43.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 9.4 12.9 6.0 27.1 27.5 37.1 
Disagree 9.5 14.9 5.4 21.9 21.4 19.1 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Looking at the trends in employment preference amongst respondents with low and high levels 
of generalised trust, the majority of respondents, regardless of level of generalised trust, Agree 
with giving preference to South Africans over foreigners.  
 
Table 4.22: Employment preference for South Africans by generalized trust, 1996-2013 
(column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to be 
careful 
Agree 79.4 84.4 84.0 76.3 78.4 78.5 49.0 51.3 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
9.8 6.2 9.7 13.5 8.4 11.0 29.8 26.9 
Disagree 10.8 9.4 6.4 10.2 13.1 10.6 21.2 21.8 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
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In 1996, 2006 and 2013, those who believed that you Need to be careful when dealing with 
people Agree that preference should be given to South African citizens when jobs are scarce. 
Between 1996 and 2013, the percentage of respondents who were neutral on the topic of 
employment preference tripled. In addition, between 1996 and 2013, the percentage of 
respondents who Disagree with employment priority being given to South Africans over 
foreigners doubled. 
  
Table 4.23: Employment preference for South Africans by financial satisfaction of 
respondent, 1996-2013 
 
Mean financial satisfaction  
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Agree 4.18 4.69 5.65 5.98 
Neither agree nor disagree 4.53 4.65 5.79 6.42 
Disagree  4.29 4.20 5.74 6.14 
Total 4.21 4.63 5.68 6.13 
Note: The mean is to be read as being the average financial satisfaction of respondents. Financial satisfaction is 
read on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is completely dissatisfied and 10 is completely satisfied.   
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Looking at the data relating to employment preference by level of financial satisfaction, as 
summarised by Table 4.23, we see that the financial satisfaction of those respondents who were 
in favour of employment preference (Agree) and who were more neutral (Neither agree nor 
disagree) increased over the four waves. The increase in the mean scores of these respondents 
moved from being more dissatisfied with their financial situation to being more satisfied. The 
mean score for respondents who Agree increased from 4.18 in 1996 to 5.98 in 2013. However, 
for those respondents who Disagree, their financial satisfaction dropped in 2001 and increased 
from 2006 onwards.  
 
4.3.4 Trends in attitudes toward migration  
“[W]ho to let in and how, and who to keep out so that citizens are protected and yet the 
economy flourishes” remains a core concern for many governments (Paton, 2014c: 4). It is this 
concern which has been instrumental in shaping many of South Africa’s policy outcomes. The 
answers to the concerns relating to who should be let in and who kept out, are also evident in 
attitudinal orientations towards migration.  
 
In assessing attitudes towards migration, respondents in the 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2013 waves 
of the WVS were asked the following: “How about people from other countries coming here 
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to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?” Four response 
categories were presented to respondents to choose from: (1) Let anyone come who wants to, 
(2) Let people come who wants to, (3) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can 
come here, and (4) Prohibit people coming here from other countries.  
 
Table 4.24: Attitudes toward migration to South Africa, 1996-2013 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Table 4.24 summaries the longitudinal trends in attitudes towards migration from 1996 to 2013. 
Looking at the trends in the data of the two extreme response categories (Let anyone come who 
wants to, and Prohibit people coming here from other countries), we see that there is an 
increase in the number of respondents who hold extremely positive or extremely negative 
attitudes towards migration. While those who believe that we should Prohibit people coming 
here from other countries has increased by 2.6%, the biggest increase is seen in the number of 
respondents who completely welcome foreigners into the country, which has more than 
doubled from 6.1% to 13.3%. In addition, we see that the number of respondents in the Let 
people come as long as there are jobs available and Place strict limits on the number of 
foreigners who can come here response categories has declined over the years.  
 
Interestingly, the 2006 results show a decline in the number of respondents who had a more 
positive attitude towards migration, as seen with the data for the Let anyone come who wants 
to and Let people come as long as there are jobs available response categories. These results 
translate into the 2006 wave of the WVS recording the highest percentage of respondents who 
believe foreigners should be prohibited from entering the country. This may be understood as 
being a precursor to the 2008 xenophobic attacks.  
 
Table 4.25 introduces the recoded attitudes towards migration dimension which divides the 
response categories into more positive attitudes about migration (let anyone come), more 
 1996 2001 2006 2013 
Let anyone come who wants to  6.1 6.2 6.0 13.3 
Let people come as long as there are jobs available 26.4 25.5 16.3 25.5 
Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can 
come here 
48.6 42.2 47.6 39.7 
Prohibit people coming here from other countries  18.9 26.1 30.1 21.5 
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negative attitudes (prohibit people) and the belief that migration can be allowed only if certain 
criteria are met84. 
 
 Table 4.25: Attitudes toward migration, 1996-2013 (recode) 
 1996 2001 2006 2013 
Let anyone come who wants 6.1 6.2 6.0 13.3 
Enter with the condition that certain criteria are met 75.0 67.7 63.9 65.2 
Prohibit people from coming  18.9 26.1 30.1 21.5 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Although the highest percentage of South Africans remain supportive of the idea that foreigners 
should be allowed into the country with the condition that certain criteria are met, we see the 
support of this idea waning (from 75.0% in 1996 to 65.2% in 2013). This is marked with the 
increase in the percentage of respondents who support more negative and positive attitudes 
towards migration.  
 
4.3.4.1 The impact of the independent variables on attitudes toward migration  
The data captured in Tables 4.26 to 4.32 allows for the study to comment on attitudes towards 
migration according to economic and non-economic factors. Table 4.26 allows us to make a 
number of descriptive observations about the trends in attitudes towards migration among 
males and females. Overall, we see that the number of male and female respondents who 
believe that anyone should be allowed into South Africa has doubled between 1996 and 2013. 
Despite this, the largest number of male and female respondents believe that foreigners can 
enter South Africa under conditions where certain criteria are met.  
 
Table 4.26: Attitudes toward migration by gender, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Male  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
5.3 6.9 7.4 4.9 7.0 5.1 13.2 13.4 
Enter with condition 
that certain criteria are 
met 
78.3 72.0 69.6 65.7 62.9 64.9 64.2 66.2 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other 
countries 
16.5 21.1 23.0 29.5 30.2 30.0 22.6 20.4 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
                                                          
84 The let people come as long as there are jobs available and place strict limits on the number of foreigners 
who can come here response categories have been recoded into “enter with the condition that certain criteria are 
met” 
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Between 1996 and 2013 we see that there is an insignificant difference between male and 
female respondents. This does not correlate with the findings of the study by Kleemans and 
Klugman (2009: 17-18) who find that males are more inclined to let people into the country.   
Assessing attitudes toward migration by race (Table 4.27), we see that most of the respondents 
within the racial groups remain centred on the belief that people should be allowed to enter the 
country with the condition that certain criteria are met.  
 
Table 4.27: Attitudes toward migration by race, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
7.0 3.5 4.0 5.2 7.4 4.2 1.1 4.5 
Enter with condition 
that certain criteria are 
met 
71.1 89.7 78.8 79.5 60.6 87.4 87.1 80.8 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other 
countries 
21.9 6.8 17.1 15.3 32.1 8.4 11.8 14.7 
 
2006 2013 
Black White Coloured Indian Black White Coloured Indian 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
6.9 2.2 2.5 3.6 14.8 8.7 5.3 14.4 
Enter with condition 
that certain criteria are 
met 
61.0 70.1 80.2 85.6 66.4 52.6 73.9 61.0 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other 
countries 
32.0 27.7 17.4 10.9 18.8 38.7 20.8 24.6 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Between 1996 and 2013, the percentage of Black South Africans who believe that we should 
Let anyone come who wants to doubled. Despite the increase in the positive attitudes towards 
migration, the percentage of Black respondents who believe that foreigners can enter the 
country with the condition that certain criteria are met and that we need to Prohibit people 
coming here from other countries has decreased. 
 
While Black South Africans foster more positive attitudes toward migration over time, the most 
noticeable change in the trends of White respondents is their growing support for prohibiting 
foreigners from entering the country. From 6.8% in 1996 to 38.7% in 2013. There is an 
insignificant change in the spread of Coloured respondents across the three responses. The data 
for Indians, indicates an increase in the percentage of respondents who have more positive and 
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negative attitudes towards migration and a decline in the percentage of respondents who 
support foreigners entering South Africa on condition that certain criteria are met.  
 
Assessing attitudes towards migration by the employment status of respondents, Table 4.28, 
the highest percentage of respondents (both employed and unemployed) believe that foreigners 
should be allowed into the country on condition that certain criteria are met. Overall the data 
shows very little variance across the respondents’ employment status.   
 
Table 4.28: Attitudes toward migration by employment status of respondent, 1996-2013 
(column percentage) 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Let anyone come who wants to 4.5 7.3 3.9 7.8 7.9 4.8 12.8 13.6 
Enter with condition that certain 
criteria are met 
77.6 73.0 76.1 61.6 62.3 64.9 66.4 64.6 
Prohibit people coming here from 
other countries 
17.9 19.7 20.0 30.6 29.8 30.3 20.8 21.8 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
According to the data presented in Table 4.29 on attitudes towards migration by level of 
education, the greatest portion of respondents across all levels of education support foreigners 
entering the country under certain conditions. 
 
In 1996, people with a primary school level education were most in favour of letting anyone 
comes who wants to enter the country (7.9%). Furthermore, respondents with a university 
education were most in favour of migration under the condition that certain criteria are met 
(85.8%) while respondents with no education were more in favour of prohibiting people 
coming here from other countries (28.3%). In 2001, as in 1996, respondents with a university 
education were most in favour of migration under the condition that certain criteria are met 
(91.4%) and respondents with no education were most in favour of prohibiting people coming 
here from other countries (43.0%).  However, despite people with No school being most in 
favour of prohibiting people coming here from other countries, this group also recorded the 
largest percentage of respondents who believed that we should Let anyone come who wants to 
(10.9%). In 2006, people with No school were most in favour of letting anyone come who wants 
to (10.2%). Respondents with some degree of university experience were most in favour of 
migration under the condition that certain criteria are met (83.0%). It was those with a primary 
school education who were most in favour of prohibiting people coming here from other 
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countries (34.6%). Lastly, in 2013, respondents with a primary school level of education were 
most in favour of letting anyone come who wants to enter the country (14.1%). Respondents 
with no formal education were most in favour of migration under the condition that certain 
criteria are met (74.1%) while respondents with a primary school level education were most 
supportive of prohibiting people coming here from other countries (26.5%).  
 
Table 4.29: Attitudes toward migration by level of education, 1996-2013 (column 
percentages) 
 1996 2001 
EDUCATION 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
5.2 7.9 5.4 4.9 10.9 7.1 5.8 2.9 
Enter with condition 
that certain criteria are 
met 
66.5 70.2 77.4 85.8 46.0 67.7 71.6 91.4 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other 
countries 
28.3 21.9 17.2 9.3 43.0 25.2 22.6 5.7 
 2006 2013 
EDUCATION 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
No 
school 
Primary 
School 
High 
School 
University 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
10.2 5.8 6.1 2.8 7.8 14.1 12.5 14.0 
Enter with condition 
that certain criteria are 
met 
58.8 59.6 63.6 83.0 74.1 59.4 64.8 66.4 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other 
countries 
31.1 34.6 30.3 14.2 18.1 26.5 22.6 19.5 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
The overarching finding relating to attitudes toward migration by social class (see Table 4.30) 
is that the majority of respondents over all four waves and all three social classes believe that 
people should be allowed into the country on condition that certain criteria are met.  
 
Assessing the trends within each class, we see that there is very little change in the data of the 
lower class respondents until 2006. In 2013, the data shows an increase in the number of 
respondents in the Let anyone come who wants to response category and a decrease in the Enter 
with condition that certain criteria are met response category. The number of lower class 
respondents in favour of prohibiting foreigners is the same in 1996 and 2013.  
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Table 4.30: Attitudes toward migration by social class, 1996-2013 (column percentages) 
 
1996 2001 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Let anyone come who wants to 6.6 5.7 2.2 5.3 6.3 17.6 
Enter with condition that certain criteria 
are met 
72.0 80.3 92.8 64.9 72.5 59.0 
Prohibit people coming here from other 
countries 
21.3 14.1 5.0 29.8 21.2 23.3 
 2006 2013 
Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper 
Let anyone come who wants to 5.8 5.9 .7 12.5 14.3 27.6 
Enter with condition that certain criteria 
are met 
62.6 67.2 63.9 66.2 63.7 55.1 
Prohibit people coming here from other 
countries 
31.6 26.8 35.4 21.3 22.0 17.3 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
For middle class respondents, the biggest change in the data between 1996 and 2013 is seen in 
the increased support for letting anyone into the country and prohibiting people coming here 
from other countries, while the support for Enter with condition that certain criteria are met 
wanes over time. Upper class respondents show interesting fluctuations over time. This can be 
seen by solely looking at the changes in the Let anyone come who wants to response category.  
There is a 15.4% increase in the percentage of respondents who believe that we should Let 
anyone come who wants to between 1996 and 2001, however by 2006 there is a 16.9% decrease 
in the support thereof. By 2013, we see a 26.9% increase in the number of respondents who 
support the idea of anyone entering the country.    
 
From the data presented in Table 4.31, pertaining to attitudes toward migration by generalized 
trust, it is evident that the majority of respondents for both those with high levels of generalized 
trust (Can be trusted) and low levels of generalized trust (Need to be careful) favour the option 
to Enter with condition that certain criteria are met. This finding holds across all four waves 
of data.   
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Table 4.31: Attitudes toward migration by generalized trust, 1996-2013 (column 
percentages) 
 
1996 2001 2006 2013 
Can be 
trusted 
Need 
to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need 
to be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to 
be 
careful 
Can be 
trusted 
Need to 
be 
careful 
Let anyone come who 
wants to 
12.6 4.4 11.6 5.4 3.9 6.4 13.1 13.4 
Enter with condition that 
certain criteria are met 
67.3 77.1 61.6 68.7 59.6 64.8 64.5 65.5 
Prohibit people coming 
here from other countries 
20.1 18.5 26.8 26.0 36.6 28.8 22.4 21.2 
 
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
Furthermore, and interesting to note, is that over all four waves of WVS, the respondents who 
have the most negative attitudes toward migration (Prohibit people coming here from other 
countries) are those who have the high levels of generalized trust.  
 
Lastly, Table 4.32 allows for a number of observations to be made about attitudes toward 
migration according by financial satisfaction. Looking at the trends in the two extreme response 
categories we see that under the Let anyone come who wants to response category, the financial 
satisfaction of respondents increases from 1996 (4.40) to 2006 (6.64) yet drops in 2013 (6.60). 
Thus, the financial satisfaction of those who advocate letting anyone enter the country has 
increased between 1996 and 2013.  
 
Table 4.32: Attitudes toward migration by financial satisfaction of respondent, 1996-
2013.  
 Mean financial satisfaction  
Response Category 1996 2001 2006 2013 
Let anyone come who wants to  4.40 4.66 6.64 6.60 
Enter with condition that certain criteria are met 4.39 4.80 5.66 6.17 
Prohibit people coming here from other countries  3.67 4.37 5.62 5.75  
Total 4.25 4.68 5.71 6.14  
Note: The mean is to be read as being the average financial satisfaction of respondents. Financial satisfaction is 
read on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is completely dissatisfied and 10 is completely satisfied.  
Source: WVS 1996; 2001; 2006; 2013. Compiled by author.  
 
The financial satisfaction of those respondents who believe that we need to Prohibit people 
coming here from other countries increases over the four waves from 3.67 in 1996 to 5.62 in 
2013. Despite the increase in financial satisfaction of these respondents, the data shows that 
the overall level of financial satisfaction of these respondents remains the lowest compared to 
the other response categories. This finding is seen across the four waves of WVS and thus we 
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can state that respondents who wish to prohibit people from coming to South Africa are the 
least satisfied with their financial situations.   
 
4.4 Analysis and interpretation of the data 
The longitudinal data presented in this chapter provides an overview of the changes in the 
dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners between 1996 and 2013. In seeking to strengthen 
the descriptive nature of this study, independent variables were introduced into the study in 
order to assess the impact of both economic and non-economic variables on the four 
dimensions. The findings and trends outlined in the previous section, in some instances, 
challenge the assumptions made regarding the trends to be noted in the data while other 
findings can be discussed within the context of developments within South Africa, such as the 
implications of the trends seen in social tolerance and a more cohesive society. It is these points 
which will shape the analysis of the data presented above.  
 
 From the data presented on the trends in the tolerance, trust, employment preference and 
attitudes towards migration; five overarching conclusions can be drawn.   
 First, South Africans are becoming increasingly intolerant of foreigners where 2013 
marked the highest level of intolerance towards this group.     
 Second, coupled with the increase in intolerance towards foreigners are the growing 
levels of distrust of not only foreign workers/immigrants but also of people of another 
nationality. When assessing which group respondents trusted the least in 2013, it became 
apparent that respondents were less trusting of foreign workers/ immigrants than people of 
another nationality. This finding corresponds with the findings of the studies by Carter (2010: 
1-2) and Mataure (2013: 3-7) who, using the 2008 and 2011 Afrobarometer data respectively, 
find that South Africans are becoming less trusting of foreigners.     
 Third, South Africans are moving away from the idea that employment priority or 
preference is to be given to South African citizens over foreigners as more respondents remain 
either neutral or unsupportive about the awarding of preference.     
 Fourth, while more South Africans are fostering positive attitudes towards migration, 
the greatest percentage of respondents agree that foreigners are to be allowed into South Africa 
on the condition that certain criteria are met.       
 Lastly, the biggest changes in the data are seen between 2006 and 2013. These changes 
can be linked to the outcomes of the global economic downturn in 2008 and the rise of 
xenophobic sentiments and violence towards foreigners in the same period.  
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The conclusions outlined above illustrate the complex nature of attitudes towards foreigners 
and the influence of social dimensions (interpersonal trust and social tolerance) compared to 
the more economic dimensions (employment preference) and psychological dimensions 
(attitudes towards migration). At the outset of this study it was assumed that the trends in each 
of the dimensions would follow a similar pattern, however, this was not the case. It was 
assumed that a general decline in levels of social tolerance and interpersonal trust would be 
seen, as well as a worsening of attitudes towards migration and more support for keeping 
foreigners out of the country. However, the data showed that, coupled with the increase in the 
level of intolerance and distrust of foreigners among South Africans, was a growing positive 
orientation towards migration and a movement by South Africans to be less supportive of 
employment priority being awarded to South Africans. Therefore, while assumptions regarding 
the increase in intolerance and distrust were met, those made about attitudes toward migration 
and employment preference were not met. These findings match the assertion made by 
Kleemans and Klugman (2009:1), that attitudes are more complex than one perceives, therefore 
rejecting the idea that attitudes will in fact be ‘monochrome’.  
 
The xenophobic attacks of 2008 and the subsequent events85, can be taken as explanatory 
factors for some of the findings presented above. Looking at the attitudes towards migration, 
the 2006 data shows the shift towards more negative orientations and attitudes towards 
migrants entering the country, a finding also reported by du Toit and Kotzé (2011). The results 
show a sizeable decline in the percentage of respondents who have a more positive attitude 
towards migration (according to the data for the Let anyone come who wants to and Let people 
come as long as there are jobs available response categories) as this year records the highest 
percentage of respondents who believe that we should Prohibit people coming here from other 
countries. Looking at this result in light of the heightened xenophobia as seen in 2008, the 2006 
results may arguably be seen as reflecting the growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which 
foreigners have been allowed to enter the country over the years, which may have motivated 
the xenophobic violence in 200886. However what is not apparent is why in 2013, the highest 
number of positive attitudes toward migration was recorded (see Table 4.25). Logically one 
would not expect to see the highest number of positive responses following the 2008 incidents 
but at least roughly the same proportion of negative responses. A possible explanation for this 
                                                          
85 Refer to Chapter 2 page 13-15.  
86 Bekker (2010: 125) identifies South Africa’s “lax border control policy, and a nonexistent immigration policy” 
as being one of the contributing factors in the rise of the xenophobia seen in 2008.  
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finding is respondent bias as at the time of the 2013 survey being conducted; respondents may 
have believed that it was not politically correct to answer negatively about foreigners following 
the 2008 attacks.  
 
One of the more overt instances where we see the impact of the xenophobic attacks and 
negative sentiments towards foreigners is in the data relating to Indians. The data shows that 
between 2006 and 2013 there was a significant increase in the level of intolerance toward 
foreign workers and immigrants. In addition, 2013 was the year where Indians recorded the 
highest levels of distrust of people of another nationality as well as foreign workers and 
immigrants. This is unsurprising given that Indians were the victims of threats of violence 
during the same period as negative sentiments towards the group were heightened. It therefore 
follows that one may argue that the significant change in the attitudes and orientations of Indian 
respondents towards foreigners was influenced by the negative sentiments which they were 
subjected to in 2012.  
 
The data also presented some interesting and at times perplexing findings. One such example 
relates to employment preference. The 1996 data showed a strong support for the idea that 
priority should be given to South Africans over foreigners. From 2001 onwards the data 
reflected a neutralising of the sense of entitlement to jobs that South Africans felt in 1996. In 
2006, the sense that employment priority should be awarded to South Africa’s increased 
slightly but not to the same degree as in 1996. In 2013, more respondents were neutral and 
unsupportive of priority given to South African citizens over foreigners. While the data reflects 
the movement away from the support of priority to South Africans over foreigners, we find that 
many South Africans are still of the belief that immigrants are a threat to the privileges of 
nationals as they hinder access to economic resources (Majavu, 2014: 19). 
 
Additional interesting findings emerged from the assessment of the four dimensions by the 
independent variables. The value of these findings rests on certain assumptions that are made 
about, not only attitudes towards foreigners, but also about the four dimensions studied.  
 
One of the first findings relates to tolerance by race. The data shows that Blacks remain the 
most intolerant racial group in 1996, 2001 and 2006. However, in 2013 this changes as Indians 
are recorded as being more intolerant of foreign workers/ immigrants. One assumption would 
be that black South Africans remain more intolerant of foreign workers/immigrants over all 
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four waves and especially following the xenophobic attacks in 2008 where most of the 
perpetrators of violence were Black South Africans. However, for Indians to move from 8.5% 
of respondents being intolerant to 56.7% in 2013 – we can speculate that the group is just not 
as overt about their dislike of foreign workers/immigrants as are black South Africans. This 
then brings into question the strength of the link between attitudes and behavioural 
manifestations.  
 
Looking at the level of trust of foreigners/immigrants (as measured in 2013) and generalized 
trust, as argued in the presentation of findings, one would assume that individuals with high 
generalized trust (believe that most people can be trusted) would also display more positive 
levels of interpersonal trust (trust group completely). However the data showed that there were 
fewer respondents who had high levels of generalized trust that completely trusted foreign 
workers/immigrants and people of another nationality, than those who only trusted them 
somewhat. This finding once again challenges the assumptions made regarding the dynamics 
and patterns of attitudes.  
 
As stated above, the trends in social tolerance and less so interpersonal trust between 1996 and 
2013 can be used to assess the country’s efforts towards achieving social cohesion, as a goal 
of the democratic government. In seeking to understand the prerequisites and processes leading 
to social cohesion, numerous definitions of social cohesion have been put forward. Social 
cohesion may be understood as “the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its 
members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation” (Accept Pluralism, 2013: 10). 
Beck, van der Maesen and Walker (1997: 284) define social cohesion as being concerned with 
the countless processes that can either establish, support, weaken or overturn social networks 
and the infrastructure which underpin these networks. For Beck et al. (1997: 284), a society 
can be defined as cohesive or having sufficient levels of social cohesion when it is able to allow 
its citizens “to exist as real human subjects, as social beings”.  
 
Importantly, Berman and Philips (2004: 2) link social cohesion to tolerance as they relate social 
cohesion to the existence of legislative frameworks for legal, political and social protection, of 
cultural norms and mores relating to citizenship, cultural pluralism, tolerance and respect. In 
this case, the level of tolerance of groups, specifically minority and marginalised groups within 
society, becomes a dimension of social tolerance which is easily measurable (Accept Pluralism, 
2013: 11). Social cohesion is also to be understood in the context of the increase in migration 
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and thus the number of foreigners in a host country given that migration brings along with it 
the rise of diversity with societies given the increase in “intercultural encounters” (UNESCO, 
2012: 1). Therefore within the context of migration, social cohesion becomes increasingly 
vulnerable due to changing national identities. Further factors influencing the vulnerability of 
social cohesion include international tensions and economic decline (UNESCO, 2012: 1).  
 
Developing social cohesion has become a core principle for the South African democratic 
government. Specific to the country, social cohesion is considered to be “the degree of social 
integration and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual 
solidarity finds expression among individuals and communities” (Department of Arts and 
Culture, 2013). Thus, a cohesive society is dependent on the extent to which all inequalities, 
exclusions and disparities have either been reduced or completely done away with in a manner 
that is planned and can be sustained and thus the movement towards a cohesive South African 
society is embedded in overcoming these issues (Department of Arts and Culture, 2013).  
 
Firstly, if social cohesion is weakened due to changes in national identity then we may say that 
South Africa’s efforts towards achieving social cohesion are challenged given that the 
increasing number of migrants entering the country has, even if insignificantly, impacted on 
the national identity of citizens. As Majavu argues (2014:19), immigrants entering the country 
are thought to undermine “black South Africanness”. Furthermore, the ever increasing levels 
of intolerance (as concluded in this study) towards foreigners further, weakens attempts at 
social cohesion and therewith overcoming the divides which characterise the country. It is these 
findings which make it apparent that achieving a cohesive society, one without disparities and 
inequalities, will not be possible until South Africans are able to accept those members of 
society who they may not necessarily like, such as foreigners.  In order to make progressive 
steps to address this, we need to include ethnicity and immigration in national discussions about 
social cohesion (Landau, 2013).  
 
Speculation about possible explanations for the change in trends in attitudes towards migration 
is challenged by the idea that attitudes towards migration and immigrants are more complex 
than one would assume (Kleemans & Klugman, 2009: 1). However, one can speculate on the 
possible impact of the findings on attitudes towards migration. The trends in the data and the 
split amongst of respondents within the response categories may lead one to believe that the 
likelihood of an overall satisfaction with country’s immigration policy is slim. This is 
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supported by the belief that due to the respondents’ views on migration ranging from Let people 
into the country to Prohibit them from entering, it is impossible that all these orientations be 
captured in the country’s immigration policy.  
 
Endorsing a strong social welfare system within South Africa has been driven by the goal of 
seeking to provide stability and security to those who had been adversely affected by apartheid 
(Department of Social Development, 2009). Establishing a solid social welfare system has led 
to South Africa reportedly being the world’s biggest welfare state (Mail & Guardian, 2010). In 
addition to reporting South Africa’s status as the world’s largest welfare state, economist Mike 
Schussler, reported that the economic dependency ratio was “three people to one taxpayer” 
(Mail & Guardian, 2010).  
 
Table 4.33: Beneficiaries of social grants in South Africa, 1996-2016 
Period  Number of social grant beneficiaries87 
1996/1997 2 408 742 
1997/1998 2 420 470 
1998/1999 2 540 998 
1999/2000 2 687 169 
2000/2001 3 773 998 
2009/2010 14 057 365 
2011/2012 15 595 705 
2013/201488 16 577 017 
2014/2015 16 920 755 
2015/2016 17 259 271 
 
Note: This table is derived from those presented by the SAIRR, 2013. 
Source: (SAIRR, 2013: 645-646). Compiled by author.   
 
The growing dependency on social grants is most noticeable in the increase in the number of 
beneficiaries thereof. According to the SAIRR (2013: 646), between 1998/1999 and 2015-
2016, there will be an estimated 579% increase in the number of beneficiaries of social grants. 
The estimates show that over a twenty year period, between 1996 and 2016, the number of 
recipients of social grants would have increased by close to 15 million (see Table 4.33). These 
figures show the increasing number of South Africans who are dependent on the state for a 
source of income. 
                                                          
87 Type of grants include: old-age pension, war-veterans grants, disability grants, foster care grants, care 
dependency grants, child support grants and grant-in-aid (SAIRR, 2013: 645).  
88 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 are projections  
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Furthermore, an increasing dependency on crime as a means of obtaining economic resources 
may be put forward as a further explanation for the trends noticed in employment preference. 
According to the national crime figures provided by the SAPS, there has been a 5% increase in 
the number of crimes committed between the periods 1994/1995 and 2012/2013 (SAIRR, 2013: 
752). According to reports, despite the relatively small increase in the number of crimes over 
the years, certain crimes involving the obtaining of money and objects which can be traded for 
money have increased (SAIRR, 2013: 752). This is seen in the 25% increase in the number of 
incidents of robbery with aggravating circumstances; these include: bank robberies, car and 
truck hijackings, robberies of residential and business premises, and the robbery of cash-in-
transit (SAIRR, 2013: 752). In addition, there has been an 8% increase in shoplifting and a 
13% increase in the number of residential burglaries while theft of and out of motor vehicles 
has declined (SAIRR, 2013: 752).  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to present the findings and trends seen in the four dimensions 
of attitudes towards foreigners between 1996 and 2013 while also introducing seven 
independent variables to further understand the dynamics of these dimensions. From the 
longitudinal investigation, the following was found: South Africans are becoming more 
intolerant, less trusting, more open to foreigners entering the country and less supportive of 
employment priority being awarded to South Africans over foreign workers/ immigrants. These 
findings prove to be a contradiction to say the least.  
 
The implications of these findings were discussed and linked to themes such as satisfaction 
with the country’s immigration policy, the South African government’s striving towards a 
cohesive society, the dependency on social grants and the rise in crime.   
 
Chapter five will provide an overview of the findings of the study and the literature covered 
while also making reference to the methodology employed in addition to making 
recommendations for future studies.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The aim of this study was to assess South Africans’ attitudes toward foreigners following the 
country’s transition to a democracy. This study set out to assess the trends in four dimensions 
of attitudes towards foreigners, which were derived from the data of the WVS between 1996 
and 2013. In strengthening the descriptive nature of this study, the four dimensions were 
analysed according to economic and non-economic characteristics of respondents in order to 
contextualise the trends within different groups of society.  
 
Incorporating the four dimensions to be measured (social tolerance, interpersonal trust, 
employment preference and attitudes toward migration), the following questions were asked: 
 Has tolerance towards foreigners increased since the country’s transition to a democracy? 
 To what extent do South Africans trust foreigners post 1996?  
 What are South African citizens’ views on migration to South Africa?  
 What do South Africans believe to be fair in terms of job opportunities presented to both 
foreigners and South Africans?  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature covering themes related to attitudes towards 
foreigners in addition to discussing the methodology and findings of the study. Lastly, 
recommendations for future studies are put forward.  
 
5.2 Studying attitudes towards foreigners  
Globalisation has facilitated the rapid movement of individuals which in turn, in conjunction 
with supplementary factors such as seeking economic opportunities, has allowed individuals 
to move to and settle in areas from which they do not originate. With the increased mobility of 
individuals, and the subsequent rise in the global migrant stock, there has been an increase in 
anti-immigrant sentiments witnessed all over the world in the form of increasing levels of 
xenophobia, discrimination and violence against foreigners. The rise of negative orientations 
towards foreigners has resulted in research focused on different dimensions and elements of 
these attitudes.  
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One of the motivations for this study was the lack of longitudinal assessments of attitudes 
towards foreigners. A further motivation was the persistent violent attacks on foreigners since 
the country’s transition to a democracy in 1994. As noted by Carter (2010: 1), “…violence 
against foreigners has become common since the transition to multi-party rule in 1994”. More 
specifically, the 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreigners, which spread across the country and 
left more than 60 people dead and thousands displaced, causes one to question what attitudinal 
manifestation has come to influence the behaviour of the perpetrators of the violence. It is from 
this standpoint that the aim and significance of this study was developed: seeking to 
longitudinally assess the attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa. This study relied on a 
definition of an attitude which emphasised the impact that attitudes have on an individual’s 
behaviour.  
 
5.3 Methodological aspects  
Drawing on the data of the WVS, four dimensions were selected in order to assess attitudes 
towards foreigners. The data on social tolerance towards foreign workers/immigrants, trust 
towards people of another nationality and foreign workers/immigrants, positions on 
employment preference, and attitudes towards migration between 1996 and 2013 were assessed 
in order to describe the trends in these dimensions. The use of four waves of WVS data (1996, 
2001, 2006 and 2013) helps categorise this study as a descriptive, longitudinal study where the 
findings and trends reported are dependent on the secondary analysis of the WVS data.  
  
Adding to the descriptive nature of this study, seven economic and non-economic independent 
variables were introduced. The dimensions were cross-tabulated with these variables, in order 
to discuss the trends in the dimensions amongst male and female respondents, respondents 
across South Africa’s four racial groups, individuals who are either employed or unemployed, 
respondents with differing levels of education, those who perceive themselves as either low, 
middle or upper class, those with different levels of generalized trust and according to 
respondents satisfaction with their financial situation.  
 
The undertaking of a longitudinal study dependent on secondary data analysis is not without 
limitations but the use of the WVS was one such way to mitigate the limitations faced. 
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5.4 Trends in dimensions of attitudes towards foreigners and recommendations for future 
research 
In answering the research questions which guided this study, four conclusions were drawn from 
each of the dimensions covered. Furthermore, the study assumed and fundamentally found that 
the biggest change in attitudes and the dimensions thereof was to be seen between the waves 
preceding and succeeding the 2008 xenophobic attacks, thus between the 2006 and 2013 waves.  
 
5.4.1 Social tolerance 
In assessing whether tolerance towards foreigners increased following the country’s transition 
to a democracy, the WVS data showed that tolerance had in fact declined as South Africans 
became increasingly intolerant of foreigners. Assessing tolerance according to the economic 
and non-economic factors yielded interesting findings. One in particular was the rise of Indians 
as the most intolerant racial group in South Africa in 2013. This finding brings forward, I argue, 
the need to acknowledge that attitudinal orientations cannot easily be assumed based on 
behaviour, given that Black South Africans have, especially between 2006 and 2013, been 
more overt about their expressions of dislike for foreigners. From this, it is possible that further 
studies may be undertaken to measure the extent to which attitudes towards foreigners and 
behaviour towards these individuals correlate with one another.  
 
5.4.2 Interpersonal trust  
As with social tolerance, the data showed a decline in the levels of trust towards people of 
another nationality while in 2013, South Africans were more distrustful of foreign workers/ 
immigrants than people of another nationality. Interestingly, when assessing interpersonal trust 
amongst respondents with low and high levels of interpersonal trust, it was found that one 
cannot assert that respondents with high levels of generalised trust would report high levels of 
trust of people of another nationality, and foreign workers and immigrants. This finding can 
thus serve as the motivator for a study which seeks to uncover the factors which distinguish 
interpersonal trust from generalised trust, and more specifically why trust of people of another 
nationality and foreign workers/immigrants is so different from that of trust of people in 
general. Thus, there are questions surrounding what it is about people of another nationality 
and foreign workers/immigrants that makes them less trustworthy.  
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5.4.3 Employment preference  
The data makes apparent the shift from the belief that South Africans have a greater entitlement 
to employment opportunities as opposed to foreigners. With the movement away from 
supporting employment preference being awarded to South Africans has been the increase in 
support of equality and a more neutral stance on the topic. However this finding proved 
interesting and challenging to understand within the context of the country’s economic 
conditions and the reasoning behind the xenophobic attacks, i.e. foreigners as competition for 
scarce and valuable resources such as employment. Further inquiries can thus be made into the 
importance of economic conditions such as unemployment rates and labour force absorption 
in shaping orientations towards employment preference.  
 
5.4.4 Attitudes towards migration  
The data regarding attitudes toward migration indicated that while more South Africans are 
fostering positive attitudes towards migration, the greatest percentage of respondents have 
more negative orientations towards migration. In seeking to understand the shift in the attitudes 
towards migration, studying the changes in attitudes towards migration in accordance with the 
amendments in the country’s immigration policy may arguably provide insight into the 
congruency between policy expectations and policy outcomes.  
 
5.4.5 Recommendations for future studies 
The conclusions drawn from this study reveal that attitudes are in fact more complex than 
initially perceived. This point, as argued by Kleemans and Klugman (2009: 1), is mirrored in 
the finding that while South Africans are becoming more distrustful and intolerant of 
foreigners, more South Africans are moving to disagree with the drive of employment 
preference being awarded to native citizens over foreigners, and are also becoming more 
positive about letting anyone enter the country. The complexities surrounding the direction of 
these dimensions of attitudes motivate the need for inquiry into what drives the outcomes of 
these dimensions. Thus, why is it that a South African who is more intolerant and distrusting 
of a foreigner/immigrant is increasingly becoming open to the idea of openly and fairly 
competing for the same employment opportunities? Such an inquisition may require further 
data analysis using inferential statistics in order to test for relationships between the four 
dimensions, and the attributes of respondents. Furthermore, qualitative techniques, such as 
focus groups and interviews, can be employed in order to gain in-depth understanding from the 
perspective of foreigners and South Africans.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
As previously stated, the aim of this study was to undertake the assessment of attitudes towards 
foreigners in South Africa between 1996 and 2013. This study was motivated by the lack of 
longitudinal studies focused on attitudes towards foreigners and also by the increase in anti-
immigrant and xenophobic sentiments. The findings presented in this study concur with the 
assertion that attitudes towards foreigners are indeed complex. It is these complexities which 
motivate the need for further studies on attitudes towards foreigners. The inclusion of the 
independent variables provides further insight into the impact that economic and non-economic 
variables have on such attitudes and thus provides a deeper understanding as to who or what 
fosters the various attitudinal orientations towards foreigners. 
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